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ABSTRACT 
Researcher: Kevin O’Leary 
Title:  THE EFFECTS OF SAFETY CULTURE AND ETHICAL   
  LEADERSHIP ON SAFETY PERFORMANCE    
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation 
Year: 2016 
This dissertation investigated the effects of safety culture and ethical leadership on safety 
performance in Fractional jet pilots in the United States.  The primary objective was to 
develop a well-fitted model linking these constructs.  A composite survey instrument was 
developed from instruments previously validated in the literature.   
There were 305 complete and valid responses from Fractional pilots.  The 
hypothesized factor structure consisted of seven factors.  The exogenous factor of safety 
culture was made up of four sub-factors.  The endogenous factors included ethical 
leadership, pilot commitment, and safety performance.  Safety performance was a second 
order factor consisting of errors and attitudes to violations.  The hypothesized model was 
not well fit for the data; therefore, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted.  The 
new model consisted of three factors: safety culture new, ethical leadership new, and not 
following procedures.   
A structural equation model was developed to test the relationships between 
constructs.  Safety culture new demonstrated a strong and significant positive effect on 
ethical leadership new.  Safety culture new, unexpectedly, did not have a significant 
negative relationship with not following procedures.  Additionally, ethical leadership new 
did not have a significant negative effect on not following procedures.  These findings 
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conflicted with previous studies in the literature that confirmed a significant relationship 
between both safety culture and ethical leadership with safety behavior.  The main 
finding illuminates the influence of safety culture new on ethical leadership new.  
Additional findings showed the factor structure for most of the previously validated 
survey instruments was not maintained in this study with the Fractional pilot data.       
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Flying on U.S. registered private jets for hire (U.S. jets) is considered a very safe 
endeavor, especially compared to flying on private jets in many other countries (Robert 
Breiling Annual Aircraft Accident Review, 2014).  However, some research states the 
accident rate in general aviation remains too high and the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) has lagged in its responsibility to regulate general aviation to 
improve safety outcomes (Kuhn, 2009).  As evidence of the FAA’s failure to effectively 
ensure safety in General Aviation, Kuhn (2009) points to the fact that the FAA has yet to 
mandate the use of Safety Management Systems (SMSs), with their associated reporting 
requirements, for either type of for-hire U.S. jet operation: fractional aircraft ownership 
programs (Fractionals) or 14 CFR air-taxi operations (Charter).   
 Over the 25-year period from 1990 through 2014, U.S. jets experienced 410 
accidents, with only 96 (23%) of those having fatalities (Breiling, 2014).  Over the period 
from 2007 through 2014, inclusive, there were 126 accidents involving U.S. jets with 27 
(21%) of those resulting in fatalities.  According to the research firm JetNet’s 
website(www.jetnet.com) , the number of U.S. jets at the beginning of 1990 was 7,336, 
while by the end of 2007 that number had risen 63% to 11,961.  Despite the increase in 
the number of U.S. jets, the average annual rate of both non-fatal accidents and fatal 
accidents has been on a downward trend.  During the period from 1990 through 2006, the 
annualized mean number of accidents was 16.6 per year with 4.3 of those being fatal 
accidents.  From 2007 through 2014, those rates had declined to 15.8 and 3.4 per year, 
respectively.   
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 During the period 2007 through 2014, for domestic flights U.S. jets had an 
average of 1.8 million departures and 2.8 million flight hours.  This total does not include 
the flights taken by U.S. jets abroad.  Therefore, since the accident data includes all 
flights of U.S. jets, the accident per flight hour rate is presumably lower than reported.  
The average accident rate per 100,000 flight hours for U.S. jets was 0.55 during this 
period.  The fatal accident rate during the same period was 0.12.  This equates to one fatal 
accident involving a U.S. jet about every 800,000 flight hours.  
 A traveler can arrange for flights on U.S. jets in three predominant service 
models: chartering a jet for hire (Charter), fractional ownership (Fractional), and 
ownership.  Charter, which is similar to using a taxi or car service, is where an aircraft 
manager supplies the pilot and aircraft.  In U.S. aviation, the operator responsible for 
these Charter flights is called the aircraft manger.  The aircraft manager must maintain a 
Federal Aviation Regulation 14 CFR part 135 (FAR 135) certificate with the FAA in 
order to offer charter flights to the public for hire.   
 A second option, Fractional, is a model in which a consumer buys a share of a 
specific aircraft and the designated aircraft management company flies the owner 
whenever a trip is requested.  Though regulated under its own section of 14 CFR, namely 
part 91(k) (FAR 91(k)), these Fractional manager’s flights are often flown under the 
arguably more stringent FAR 135 rules and regulations, where the management 
company, rather than the owner, maintains operational control of the majority of the 
flights.   
 The final option to fly a jet privately is full ownership, where a person or entity 
purchases a private aircraft.  The private jet owner is responsible for the operation of the 
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aircraft.  Many of the owner’s responsibilities can be delegated to an aircraft management 
company; however, the owner maintains operational control under 14 CFR part 91 (FAR 
91). 
 Both Fractional and Charter managers hold the same type of FAR 135 certificate, 
operate under similar rules and regulations, maintain operational control of the majority 
of their flights, and are subject to similar scrutiny by the FAA.  However, the annual 
accident totals and accidents per hour flown rates are substantially different between 
these two groups as shown in Figure 1.  Over the 25-year period from 1990 through 2014, 
the U.S. jet Charter operators have been involved in 188 accidents with 46 (24%) of those 
being fatal.  The U.S. jet Fractional operators were involved in just 26 accidents over the 
same period with zero fatal accidents.  In the period from 2007 through 2014, the U.S. jet 
Charter operators have averaged a rate of 6.0 accidents with 1.4 (23%) fatal accidents per 
year, while the Fractional operators have averaged 1.4 accidents per year and zero fatal 
accidents (Robert Breiling Annual Aircraft Accident Review, 2014).  
 In the period from 2007 through 2014, the U.S. jet Charter accident rate per 
100,000 flight hours averaged .71 (TRAQPak Report, 2014).  The fatal accident rate 
during the same period was .16.  The U.S. jet Fractional accident rate during the same 
period was .27 per 100,000 flight hours with zero fatal accidents.  The Charter rate of 
accidents per 100,000 flight hours of 0.71 is 0.16 (29%) higher than the U.S. jet fleet 
average of 0.55; conversely, the Fractional rate is 0.28 (51%) lower at 0.27.  The fatal 
accident rate per 100,000 flight hours for Charter (0.16) is .04 (33%) higher than the U.S. 
jet average of 0.12, while Fractional did not have a fatal accident during this period.  
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Fractional did not had a single fatal accident during the period of 1990 through 2014 
(Robert Breiling Annual Aircraft Accident Review, 2014).   
 
 
 
Figure 1.  U.S. Jet Accident Rate.  The U.S. jet fleet average accident rate per 100,000 
flight hours for the period of 2007 through 2014.  (Breiling 2014; TRAQpak 2014). 
 
 
 
 The focus on causation of aircraft accidents has shifted since the early 1990s.  The 
previous research on accident causation concentrated on a very granular search for the 
final causal or contributing factors that lead to the accident.  This causation research often 
pointed to the last line of defense in the entire safety system: the pilot.  Accident 
investigators diligently searched for the smoking gun or the last item in a chain of events 
that, had it been corrected likely would have changed the course of events and prevented 
the accident.  Because pilots are the last line of defense in the safety system, they were 
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indicated as the main causal factor in the vast majority of aviation accidents (Vincoli, 
1990).  
 In the last 25 years, safety has evolved into its own discipline where processes are 
designed and implemented to make flying safer (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015).  Historically, 
pilots were blamed as the cause of most aviation accidents; however, in the 1990’s, this 
trend started to evolve.  This paradigm shift was the result of the growing understanding 
of safety as a system and consideration of the multiple causal interactions of accidents.  
These multiple causal interactions include those that reside within the flight organization, 
such as group behaviors and culture.  Many human factors researchers, such as von 
Thaden, Wiegmann, & Shappell (2006);  Jennings (2008);  and Li, Harris, and Yu (2008) 
have revisited aviation accidents dating back many years and have persuasively 
demonstrated that the organization and its characteristics strongly influenced the causal 
factors of the majority of accidents.  The aforementioned research results were important 
because they illuminated the key interrelationships within an organization.  This 
increased understanding of these key interrelationships provided the opportunity to make 
organizational changes that were likely to further enhance safety.   
 As a result of this shift in understanding of the importance of organizational 
characteristics in maintaining and improving safety, the effort to measure the safety 
culture, organizational commitment, and even ethics of the organization has gained 
momentum in the literature.  Researchers have attempted to develop and validate survey 
instruments to take these measurements in order to better understand how they influence 
safety outcomes, such as occupational accidents and safety performance (Alsowayigh, 
2014; Freiwald, 2013; Zohar, 1980).  If the safety culture or ethics of an organization can 
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be accurately measured and shown to have a predictable influence on future safety 
outcomes or performance, this could create an opportunity for comparatively low cost 
interventions that would significantly improve safety in the system (Freiwald, 2013).  
 
Statement of the Problem 
 To date, the relationship of safety culture, ethical leadership, pilot commitment to 
the organization, and safety performance has not been measured or investigated in U.S. 
jet Fractionals.  Though these constructs have been studied in many airlines, the 
Fractionals differ operationally from airlines in many ways.  The Fractionals, for 
example, fly exclusively point to point and do not fly in the hub-and-spoke flight patterns 
common to most airlines.  The historical differences in the total number and rate of both 
fatal and non-fatal accidents are strong quantitative evidence that suggests there are 
operational and likely cultural differences between the U.S. jet Fractional and U.S. jet 
Charter operators.   
 
Purpose Statement 
 The purpose of this study was to examine: (1) the Fractional pilots’ perceptions of 
their organizations’ level of safety culture and ethical leadership, and (2) the potential 
influence of these perceptions on the pilot’s commitment to the organization and their 
safety performance.  Since the Fractional operators have fewer accidents than the Charter 
operators in the U.S. during the period under review, the practical application of this 
research could be the identification of a baseline model for safety culture.  Future studies 
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would be required to research the safety culture of the Charter companies and compare 
results.   
 
Research Questions 
 This research addressed four questions that were derived from the research 
conducted by Alsowayigh (2014) on Saudi Airline pilots and Freiwald (2013) on aviation 
and healthcare personnel.  
1. How does safety culture influence safety performance at U.S. jet Fractionals?  
2. How does safety culture influence ethical leadership at U.S. jet Fractionals?  
3. How does safety culture influence pilot commitment to the organization at U.S. 
jet Fractionals?   
4. How do ethical leadership and pilot commitment to the organization influence 
safety performance at U.S. jet Fractionals?  
 
Delimitations  
 The survey data collected in this study were comprised of responses from the 
pilots of major U.S. jet FAR 135 Fractional operators with more than 25 jets under 
management.  The 25 jet minimum was selected because only three companies exceed 25 
jets (NetJets, FlexJet, and Executive AirShare) and are estimated to operate 97.6% of the 
Fractional jet aircraft in the U.S. (www.JetNet.com; November 7, 2015).            
 It was not within the scope of this research to investigate safety outcomes from 
the NTSB accident investigation reports, Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA), 
or other criterion-based data to search for relationships or causation.  This is due to the 
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concern in the literature that accident rates are too low to make valid predictions 
(O’Connor et al., 2011), and criterion based data such as FOQA are not consistently 
recorded across general aviation aircraft (Cistone et al., 2011); data recording systems are 
expensive to install and therefore inconsistently deployed in the fleet (Mitchell, Sholy, & 
Stolzer, 2007); and data that were recorded are not publically available.  
 This research was not intended to develop the appropriate path to improvement of 
U.S. jet FAR 135 operations, but rather to determine the relationships between safety 
culture, ethical leadership, pilot commitment, and safety performance of U.S. jet 
Fractionals. 
 
Limitations 
 This study was intended to measure and investigate the relationships between the 
constructs of safety culture, ethical leadership, and safety performance for U.S. jet 
Fractional operators.  It was assumed that due to the fact the pilots were notified through 
their unions, nearly all pilots had the opportunity to complete the survey, and therefore 
the results will likely be generalizable throughout the organization.  Additionally, since 
these pilots represent over 97% of the Fractional pilots in the U.S., the results are likely 
to be generalizable to all U.S. Fractional pilots.  Non-response bias was tested through a 
comparison of the results between different survey collection dates.  The comparison 
included an analysis of the responses by similar demographic groups across various 
survey collection dates.   
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 The construct for safety performance was self-reported items describing pilot 
errors and their attitudes to violations.  There are concerns in the literature about the 
potential inaccuracy due to the nature of self-reported items (O’Connor et al., 2011).  
 
Definitions of Terms 
AMC  Aircraft Management Companies are those companies managing  
  jet aircraft and offering flights to the public for hire.  Both   
  fractional jet managers (Fractional) and U.S. jet FAR 135 aircraft  
  management companies (Charter) are considered AMCs.   
Charter  Charter refers to the companies where flights are    
  offered to the public for hire by a certificated FAR 135 aircraft  
  management company. 
charter  When not capitalized, this term refers to flights flown by Charter 
companies for hire. 
Fractional(s) Fractional aircraft management company(ies) 
Micro- 
accidents These are small workplace accidents such as cuts and bruises.  
U.S. jets Refers to U.S. registered private jets that are used in a Fractional  
  aircraft program or flown by a duly certificated FAR 135 aircraft  
  management company for hire. 
 
List of Acronyms 
AMC Aircraft Management Company (both Fractional & Charter) 
ELS Ethical Leadership Scale 
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FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FOQA Flight Operations Quality Assurance 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
PCAMC Pilot Commitment to AMC 
SEM Structural Equation Model 
SCFSS Safety Culture Formal Safety System 
SCISS Safety Culture Informal Safety System 
SCOC Safety Culture Organizational Commitment 
SCOP Safety Culture Operations Personnel 
SPATV Safety Performance Attitude To Violations 
SPERR Safety Performance Pilot Error Behavior 
ZCSQ Zohar Client Safety Questionnaire 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Introduction 
 The review provided in this chapter begins with a brief history of aircraft accident 
investigations and how the conduct of these investigations has evolved over the last 40 
years.  Accident investigation is considered one of the initial steps in aviation history 
directed toward improving safety through better understanding the causal factors in 
accidents and applying that knowledge to preventing similar accidents in the future 
(Stolzer & Goglia, 2015).  Accident investigators have, in both past and current 
investigations, conducted a very granular analysis of each accident to determine the 
proximate causal factors.  Once the causal factors are determined, the results are 
categorized and analyzed across many accidents to identify themes.  The knowledge 
gained from these accidents and subsequent analyses or themes has inspired the 
development of new technologies, equipment, and procedures that have contributed to the 
continued improvements in aviation safety (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015). 
 With improvements in technology, equipment, and procedures, accident 
investigators began to find fewer and fewer causal factors attributable to equipment 
failures (Vincoli, 1990).  These improvements in the reliability of both the equipment and 
procedures led investigators to label the main causal factor in the majority of accidents as 
pilot or human error (Vincoli, 1990).  Since the majority of accidents were and continue 
to be determined to be pilot error, and the goal in aviation was to continue to improve 
safety, aviation practitioners needed to better understand the causes of human error, and 
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more specifically the active and latent conditions that contributed to the malfunction of 
the pilot (Reason, 1990).   
 As the construct of human error became more fully understood, aviation accident 
investigators and practitioners still needed to further adapt these concepts to an aviation 
setting to continue the improvements in safety outcomes.  The study of human error 
provided a framework for scholars to adapt those, along with other concepts, to develop 
the human factors classification system (HFACS).  HFACS provided a common 
taxonomy that enabled accident investigators, aviation practitioners, and researchers to 
both identify and categorize human errors (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997).  The errors 
were labeled active (human mistakes), latent, or organizational factors (training, over 
scheduling, or procedures errors, etc.) that contributed to accidents that had been labeled 
as just pilot error in the past (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997).   
 Along with the study of HFACS, organizational culture began to emerge as an 
important construct in the literature as a possible antecedent to safety outcomes (Cox & 
Flin, 1998; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Zohar, 1980).  Studies focusing on safety culture, 
communication, cockpit resource management, employee commitment to the 
organization, and company leadership began to emerge in the literature as possible 
constructs that could be measured and had the potential to influence safety outcomes.  
 This study builds upon previous research focused on the constructs of safety 
culture (Alsowayigh, 2014), ethical leadership (Freiwald, 2013), and their potential 
influence on self-reported safety performance, such as a pilot admitting to making 
occasional errors.  If these relationships exist and are significant, this research has the 
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potential to provide insight into a possible safety culture model for Charter operators to 
follow that could improve safety in U.S. jet FAR 135 operations overall.   
 
Accident Investigation 
 When aviation accident investigation began, there was a “fly-crash-fix-fly” 
approach (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015, p.15).  The investigator’s mission was to determine 
the cause of the accident, publicize the results, and adopt new regulations to prevent 
future re-occurrences with the same cause.  The causes sometimes were related to 
unforeseen weather conditions, design flaws, structural/mechanical failures, or human 
error (most often by pilots and sometimes by mechanics) (Stolzer et al., 2011).  
 An article by Walter Tye published in 1980 demonstrates the major concerns of 
the day with commercial aviation.  Tye wrote, to improve aviation’s upward trend in 
safety, the industry had to focus on new aircraft designs, improvements in avionics to 
avoid mid-air collisions and controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), and, ultimately, better 
procedures (Tye, 1980).  Tye’s research estimated that approximately one-half of the fatal 
commercial aviation accidents from 1972 until 1980 were the result of CFIT and, 
additionally, almost 25% were from mid-air collisions (Tye, 1980). 
 Some examples of accidents include: In 1987 a Learjet 35A sustained substantial 
damage after a hard landing in rain and heavy winds.  The National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) named wind shear as one of the main contributing factors (NTSB Brief 
MIA88LA026, 1989).  In 1990, a Lear 24 experienced a fire in the cockpit when the 
wires from the map light chafed together, causing the wires to arc, and resulting in a 
cockpit fire that precipitated a forced landing (NTSB Brief ATL90LA080, 1992).  A 
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different accident which resulted from a gear failure on a Challenger in 1997 (NTSB 
Brief: ATL96LA073, 1997) could have been avoided through better organizational 
procedures.  The NTSB report suggested that improved procedures at the aircraft 
management company requiring use of the emergency gear extension checklist may have 
prevented the accident.  The NTSB recommendation centered on the pilot neglecting to 
verify the gear was down and locked after an initial indication that the gear was not 
locked in place, which is the proper procedure as published in the aircraft’s operating 
handbook.  
 Tye’s suggestions from 1980 have all been adopted; first by the commercial 
aircraft manufacturers and later by the private jet manufacturers.  Avionics improvements 
included ground proximity warning systems, traffic collision avoidance, and ground 
based and cockpit based wind shear detection systems.  Additionally, procedural 
improvements were made such as the adoption of crew resource management (CRM) 
programs.  Aircraft designs improved structural soundness and systems reliability.  As 
Tye’s published suggestions have been implemented in aviation, the accident rates have 
continued to decline. 
 
Pilot Error Causing Accidents  
 The reliability of aircraft as well as of the air transportation system itself 
improved in the 1980s (Vincoli, 1990).  As suggested in later research, the main causal 
factor in most aviation accidents was pilot error (Vincoli, 1990).  In the previous 20 
years, the NTSB had identified pilot error as the primary cause for 66% of aviation 
accidents (Vincoli, 1990).  The U.S. Army conducted a study and concluded that over 
15 
 
80% of Army aviation accidents during the years 1958-1976 were the result of pilot error 
(Vincoli, 1990).  This led to the NTSB seemingly declaring pilot error as its default 
finding, as evidenced by two cases where independent investigators reviewed the 
evidence and found conclusive proof of mechanical failures previously missed by the 
NTSB that were major causal factors (Vincoli, 1990). 
 Vincoli went on to warn the industry and the investigators that safety of flight is 
the responsibility of the aircraft manager or airline, and this responsibility cannot be 
delegated to the pilot (Vincoli, 1990).  Vincoli also warned that if the trend of 
disproportionately identifying pilot error as the primary cause in the vast majority of 
accidents continued, the industry would not be able to move forward to improve safety, 
nor to prevent future accidents effectively. 
 
Human Error 
 In 1982, Rasmussen wrote his seminal paper describing human error, attempting 
to bring structure to the construct and foster proper collection of data.  In his work, he 
described the characteristics and definitions associated with human failure.  It was 
asserted that most inadequate results or outright systems failures could be traced back to 
human failure in design, operation, or maintenance (Rasmussen, 1982).  The author also 
pointed out that quite often the system failure was the result of a latent condition that 
existed prior to the actual system failure (Rasmussen, 1982). 
 Reason’s 1990 book Human Error furthered the body of knowledge on the topic 
of human malfunctions and continued to provide understanding of where humans are 
likely to fail in a complex safety system such as those comprising aviation.  Reason 
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postulated that there were two main types of human errors: active and latent.  Active 
errors occur when the operator of a system, such as the pilot of an aircraft has the wrong 
reaction to a stimulus or situation and proximately causes the system failure.  Conversely, 
a latent error may occur far away from and long before the system failure, such as an 
aircraft manager over-scheduling a crew which contributes to the pilot’s fatigue and 
reduced effectiveness (Reason, 1990).  Since most pilots overestimate their personal 
capabilities, they are unlikely to acknowledge or admit their reduced abilities when 
stressed or fatigued (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). 
 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
 Building upon the research from Rasmussen and Reason, Shappell and Wiegmann 
published Human Error Approach to Accident Investigation: The Taxonomy of Unsafe 
Operations in 1997.  This research contributed to what is now known as HFACS.  The 
authors’ objective was to develop a common taxonomy for accident investigators to use 
when classifying types of human errors.  A common taxonomy allows researchers and 
practitioners to communicate more effectively.  The goal of HFACS was to determine 
both the active (human) errors and the latent (organizational) errors.  Shappell & 
Wiegmann attempted to determine the true root cause of aviation accidents in order to 
take the next step toward improving aviation safety (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997). 
 In the 1990s, there was a paradigm shift in the literature in which aviation 
accidents were considered to be the result of a chain of events rather than being due to a 
single, proximate cause.  The root causes, which had often been blamed on just the pilots, 
were expanded to include the latent failures of the aviation organization (McFadden & 
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Towell, 1999).  Aviation accidents that were classified as pilot error have been re-
examined using the HFACS perspective, and many latent or organizational errors have 
been identified (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001).  These findings have motivated a 
fundamental shift toward proactive system improvement to enable aviation organizations 
to reduce the incidence of latent errors and thereby forestall accidents (McFadden & 
Towell, 1999).     
 
Culture  
 Culture is commonly associated with national culture and has its roots in 
anthropology.  It is concerned with the core values of a group (Cox & Flin, 1998).  Pilots 
experience three distinct cultures in their work: national, professional, and organizational 
(Helmreich & Merritt, 1998).  In January of 1990, Avianca Flight 52 crashed in New 
York as a result of fuel starvation.  The flight engineer was aware of the criticality of the 
situation but failed to make those concerns known to the captain.  In this situation, all 
three forms of culture, national (deference to authority), professional (not questioning the 
higher ranking captain), and organizational (lack of CRM) contributed to the chain of 
events that resulted in an otherwise avoidable aviation accident (Helmreich & Merritt, 
1998).  
 Aviation professionals have a distinct culture.  In that professional culture, pilots 
have a specialized skill that provides prestige and high pay, which encourages some 
pilots to feel overconfident (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998).  This feeling of overconfidence 
can lead to poor decision making, such as skipping routine checklists and taking 
unnecessary risks (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998).  In the Avianca case, the crew had many 
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options to divert the aircraft; however, poor crew communication led to the continuation 
of the flight to the point of fuel exhaustion.   
 The development of CRM was motivated by a desire to address both 
organizational and pilots’ professional culture factors that had been shown to contribute 
to accidents.  As it has been implemented in aviation organizations, CRM has 
demonstrated success at increasing communications in the cockpit and breaking down 
several barriers to optimally safe and efficient aircraft operation (Helmreich & Merritt, 
1998).  CRM is implemented in part by creating a subculture in the overall organizational 
culture comprised of a set of values and norms required to support the effective use of 
CRM operational practices.   
National culture is a broader term related to those values, norms, and beliefs held 
by particular nationalities (Helmreich, 1998).  The Avianca flight is an example of the 
consequences of poor or absent CRM practices.  The flight engineer knew the aircraft 
was critically low on fuel; however, the flight engineer neglected to communicate that 
situation clearly to the captain.  A combination of the flight engineer’s national culture, 
Avianca’s organizational culture, and the flight engineer’s professional culture did not 
provide the flight engineer with the confidence to communicate a critical safety issue to 
the captain (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998).  Though this flight’s mishap can correctly be 
assigned a proximate cause of pilot error, HFACS would identify the latent 
organizational, professional, and cultural issues as major contributing factors.   
 Subsequent research into culture asserted that culture surrounds the organization 
and is intertwined with leadership and its behavior (Schein, 2004).  Therefore, a leader 
can engineer culture by attempting to insert values into the organization that will 
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influence and govern employee behavior and interactions (Schein, 2004).  Because of the 
stable nature of the values set forth in organizational culture, it has been called the 
personality of the organization (Cox & Flin, 1998, Schein, 2004).             
 
Safety Culture 
 “A safety culture is more than a group of individuals promulgating a set of safety 
guidelines, it is a group of individuals guided in their behavior by their joint belief in the 
importance of safety (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998, p. 133).”   
 Safety culture is a subset of the overall culture in an organization.  The term 
safety culture first came to prominence from the report on the Chernobyl nuclear disaster 
from the International Atomic Energy Agency (Cox & Flin, 1998).  The report discussed 
the poor safety culture that was present in the Russian nuclear plant.  Safety culture is 
comprised of beliefs and values held in an organization regarding employee safety, 
hazard reduction, and a safe work environment (Cox & Flin, 1998).  These values are 
stable, meaning they do not fluctuate in the short term (Cox & Flin, 1998).  Initially, 
some researchers expressed concerns that the importance of safety culture was overstated 
and that it was not a proven theoretical concept (Cox & Flin, 1998).  In contrast, other 
research in CRM fully supported the concept of culture as relevant to understanding and 
motivating positive change in the larger organizational culture, and showing that changes 
in culture had the ability to improve or reduce safety (Helmreich et al., 1997). 
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Safety Climate 
 The concept of organizational climate dates back to the 1930s; however, the 
measurement of the character of an organization did not start until the 1960s (Cox & Flin, 
1998).  Safety climate is the subset of the organizational climate that focuses on safety 
(Neal et al., 2000).  The literature often treats the constructs of culture and climate 
interchangeably (Mearns & Flin, 1999).  The difference between culture and climate has 
been compared to the differences between personality and mood of a person.  A person’s 
personality is based on the person’s own core values and principles, and though it can be 
changed, it cannot be changed quickly; like culture, it is stable and enduring.  
Organizational climate, conversely, is more closely associated with a person’s mood, 
which can change quickly based on the environment and the day’s activity; therefore, it is 
short term and more variable, and measurements of climate are similar to a snapshot at 
one point in time (Cox & Flin, 1998).   
 The construct of safety climate was enhanced by the research of Zohar in the early 
1980s.  The research included a 40-item survey that was randomly distributed to 20 
workers in 20 different industrial organizations (Zohar, 1980).  The researcher then 
compared the results of the survey with the results of an independent safety inspector’s 
evaluation of the safety effectiveness of each industrial organization.  There was a high 
correlation between the inspector’s evaluations of the effectiveness of safety programs at 
the different companies and the survey results from the workers (Zohar, 1980).  The 
highest level of correlation was between the worker’s perceptions of management’s 
attitudes about safety and the rated effectiveness by the inspectors (Zohar, 1980).   
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Safety Climate and Culture as Predictors of Safety Performance (Outcomes) 
 The Zohar safety climate research was instrumental in developing the concept of 
safety climate though the use of an independent measurement to validate the results.  
Helmreich et al. used a similar validation technique in 1986; the research measured pilot 
attitudes and compared those responses to their performance evaluations from 
experienced check airmen.  The study showed an attitude-performance linkage 
(Helmreich et al., 1986). 
 The Zohar and Helmreich et al. studies were important because they not only 
validated the construct of safety climate, they also established there was a link to 
performance.  The accident rate in aviation is very low; therefore, it lacks the sensitivity 
to establish the predictor variables for safety performance or accidents (O’Connor et al., 
2011).  The importance of measuring both safety climate and safety culture lies in the 
potential to harness their predictive capability to improve safety performance and reduce 
accidents. 
 Before 2000, there were few research studies on the connection between safety 
climate and safety behavior, though many studies have shown a correlation between 
safety climate and safety outcomes (Neal et al., 2000; O’Toole, 2002).  Researchers 
hypothesized that organizational climate would exert influence on safety climate, and 
safety climate would exert influence on safety performance (Neal et al., 2000).  Neal et 
al. (2000) defined safety performance as compliance with procedures and promotion of 
safety.  It should be noted this research relied on self-reporting of safety performance, 
which has been criticized in the literature as potentially biased (Barling et al., 2002).  
Zohar asserted “safety climate research has been hampered by a lack of criterion data” 
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(Zohar, 2000, p. 589).  O’Connor et al. (2011) suggested using objective data such as 
FOQA to evaluate safety performance.    
 The findings of the Neal et al. (2000) research support the hypothesis that 
organizational climate had a significant impact on safety climate.  Safety climate had a 
significant impact on self-reported safety compliance, and safety climate is a predictor of 
safety performance (Neal et al., 2000). 
 Additional criterion-based safety climate research was conducted to predict the 
effect of group climate on micro-accidents in the manufacturing industry (Zohar, 2000).  
This research used a newly developed scale to estimate the perception of safety climate of 
factory workers.  The data on micro-accidents was recorded during the five-month period 
following the safety climate survey.  The results established an empirical link between 
safety climate and micro-accidents where the group safety climate predicted the safety 
outcomes (Zohar, 2000).  Zohar’s research suggested that an increase in micro-accidents 
was a predictor of larger or catastrophic accidents (Zohar, 2000).  In 2004, there was a 
study conducted in Japan on the track maintenance train operators’ attitudes versus 
objective accident data.  The findings suggested that operator attitudes were significantly 
correlated with accidents, and the recommendation called for proactive improvements in 
attitudes in order to improve safety (Itoh et al., 2004).   
 Cooper & Phillips (2004) conducted a safety climate study before and after a 
behavioral safety initiative.  Their findings concluded the relationship of safety climate to 
safety behavior though the relationship between safety behavior and accidents was not as 
strong as other similar findings in the literature.  Though the researchers concluded that 
the statistical relationship between safety climate and accidents was neither direct nor 
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significant, the research suggested that safety climate measurements are useful in 
assessing the effectiveness of how safety is operationalized in an organization (Cooper & 
Phillips, 2004). 
 A case study was undertaken to evaluate the safety culture of a large construction 
company and its influence on safety performance.  The construction company had 
implemented safety initiatives that had varied in success across different regions.  The 
case study employed a mixed method analysis consisting of in-depth interviews, safety 
surveys, and qualitative observations.  The results indicated that safety culture had a 
mediating role over safety performance (Cai, 2005).  One main concern that was 
identified was the construction company was found to be taking the human error position 
when determining the cause of accidents rather than an organizational error approach, 
which is harmful to safety culture and safety reporting (Cai, 2005).   
 Clarke published a meta-analysis of criterion-based research of the relationship 
between safety climate, safety performance, and accidents in 2006.  The research showed 
that, in all studies, the relationship between safety climate was found to be positive, 
though weak, and with a large standard deviation; therefore, the safety climate link to 
accidents was not strongly supported (Clarke, 2006).  In the case of prospective research 
designs where the safety climate measurement takes place before the safety data were 
collected, the link between safety climate and accidents was found to be valid and 
generalizable (Clarke, 2006).  The link between safety climate and safety performance 
was positive, and overall the research supported the concept that improving safety 
climate would improve safety performance (compliance and participation) and help to 
reduce accidents (Clarke, 2006). 
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 Few multi-year studies have been conducted, but one exception is the research by 
Neal and Griffin in 2006.  This study was conducted over a five-year period with safety 
climate measures from two separate sampling frames compared with criterion accident 
data.  The researchers were attempting to determine a link between safety climate and 
safety motivation as well as the link between safety motivation and behavior, under the 
hypothesis that safety motivation plays a mediating role between safety climate and 
safety performance.  The researchers found that there is a reciprocal relationship between 
safety motivation and safety participation (safety participation is a component of safety 
performance), which indicates that participating in safety tasks that benefit the 
organization leads to higher motivation (Neal & Griffin, 2006).  Additional findings 
showed that, at the group level, self-reported safety behavior has predictive validity for 
accidents (Neal & Griffin, 2006). 
 Despite all of the positive results cited above, Johnson opined that the predictive 
validity of safety climate had not yet been firmly established in the literature (Johnson, 
2007).  Johnson conducted a study that used the 16 item Zohar Safety Client 
Questionnaire (ZCSQ) on 292 workers at three manufacturing facilities and subsequently 
monitored the accident experience data for the following five-month period.  The results 
showed that the ZCSQ could be reduced to 11 items with little loss of explanatory power, 
and the predictive validity of safety climate to predict accidents was confirmed (Johnson, 
2007).  
 The research result of safety climate as a valid predictor of safety performance 
was further supported by Chang and Lu (2009) and then by Kao et al. (2009).  However, 
the predictive validity of safety climate and patient outcomes were not supported in 
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Wilson’s (2007) and Lyon’s (2007) dissertations.  Lyon’s dissertation on the relationship 
between safety culture and infections found contrary evidence that safety climate was low 
when infections were low (Lyon, 2007).  Goodheart & Smith (2014) suggested that safety 
climate predicting safety performance might not be generalizable to aviation from other 
industries.    
 O’Connor et al. (2011) conducted an in-depth meta-analysis of safety climate 
studies in the aviation industry.  The research analyzed 23 studies conducted in aviation.  
Pilots and mechanics made up nearly 65% of the respondents, while 17% had a mixed 
target, and the remainders were either cabin crew or ground handlers.  Half of the 
respondents were military personnel.  O’Connor argues that safety climate research needs 
to continue to focus less on developing and validating new survey instruments and more 
on the ability of the existing instruments to discriminate among groups (O’Connor et al., 
2011).  The construct validity of safety climate as a social measure is reasonable, though 
there is a lack of agreement in themes across aviation safety climate questionnaires 
(O’Connor et al., 2011).  There would be a benefit to consolidating the themes in the 
literature and to have more consistency.  The greater problem with the extant research is 
the lack of testing of discriminant validity (O’Connor et al., 2011).  If the existing 
instruments are not able to discriminate among groups with differing safety performance 
scores, the instruments will be of little usefulness as a leading indicator of safety issues 
(O’Connor et al., 2011). 
 Gibbons, von Thaden, and Wiegmann designed a survey instrument in 2006 with 
the intention of being more comprehensive than the existing safety climate and safety 
culture instruments available.  The authors named this improved survey the Commercial 
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Aviation Safety Survey (CASS).  The questionnaire started as an 84 item tool but after 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), was later revised to 55 items with four general 
factors (Organizational Commitment, Operations Personnel, Informal Safety System, and 
Formal Safety System) and 12 sub-factors as shown in Figure 2 (Gibbons et al., 2006; 
O’Connor et al. 2011; Alsowayigh, 2014).  The CASS has been chosen for this research 
because it has been deployed in several airlines worldwide, including Saudi Airlines in 
2014 and has maintained consistent results.   
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Commercial Aviation Safety Survey Factor Structure (Alsowayigh, 2014 
p.30). 
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 The Saudi Airlines study used the CASS and compared it with self-reported safety 
performance, which was measured by pilot attitude to violations and pilot error behavior 
(Alsowayigh, 2014).  The study included 247 voluntary responses which represented a 
29% response rate from active Saudi Airlines pilots.  The results were validated with 
CFA, and the relationships among variables were analyzed using structural equation 
modeling (SEM) (Alsowayigh, 2014). 
 The Saudi Airline results showed that safety culture had a direct and significant 
influence over pilot’s own attitudes to violations and had a mediating role on pilot error 
behaviors (Alsowayigh, 2014).  Safety culture was found to have neither a direct nor a 
significant influence over pilot error behavior, though this relationship was mediated by 
pilot’s attitude to violations (Alsowayigh, 2014).  Pilot’s commitment to the airline did 
not have a significant relationship with either pilot error behavior or attitude to violations, 
which suggests that a pilot’s safety performance, as measured by these self-reported 
variables, is not strongly related to the characteristics of the organization where the pilot 
is employed (Alsowayigh, 2014). 
 The CASS was designed to be a comprehensive instrument to measure the safety 
culture for aviation organizations (Gibbons et al., 2006).  Other multi-use instruments, 
such as Zohar’s safety climate scale are significantly shorter than the CASS and were 
designed to take a quick view or snap shot of safety climate of many types of 
organizations, whereas the CASS was developed specifically for the aviation industry.  
Additionally, the CASS has also been deployed in many airlines worldwide, and the 
constructs have remained stable.  The comprehensive nature of the CASS does make it 
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longer than other instruments, which requires respondents to spend more time completing 
the survey.  
 
Employee Commitment to the Organization 
 In the past, the commitment to the organizations was measured to determine the 
likelihood of employee retention.  In a longitudinal study over a six-year period, Sheridan 
(1992) studied the organizational commitment by young accountants entering the 
profession.  The researcher controlled for changes in the economy and for labor market 
fluctuations to evaluate the role of organizational culture and its relationship to employee 
retention. 
 At about the same time the Sheridan (1992) six-year longitudinal study was 
concluding, Meyer & Allen (1991) were researching the causal implications of employee 
commitment to an organization.  Their research showed that employee commitment to an 
organization was related to how the employee was involved in decision making (Meyer 
& Allen, 1991; Walton, 1985) in the organization and how their company decisions 
aligned with their own values (Meyer & Allen, 1991).  The researchers during this period 
began to analyze the construct of employee commitment to the organization as a causal 
factor; the researchers agreed that the existing structural equation models only showed 
evidence of directional relationship without any conclusive findings (Meyer & Allen, 
1991). 
 Researchers interested in the construct of employee commitment to the 
organization continued to search for directional relationships.  Alsowayigh (2014) 
researched the pilot’s commitment to the Saudi Airlines, not as a casual factor, but as a 
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mediator between safety culture and safety performance (Alsowayigh, 2014).  The pilot 
commitment to Saudi Airlines was measured with the Porter et al. (1974) nine-item 
Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (OCQ).  The OCQ has a 14-item version and 
nine-item version; the nine-item version was suggested in the literature (Commerias & 
Fournier, 2001) and was used in the Alsowayigh (2014) study.  The OCQ measured the 
employees’ willingness to go above and beyond for their organization and to what extent 
employees associated themselves with the company’s success (Commerias & Fournier, 
2001). 
 Alsowayigh’s results (2014) showed that the pilot’s commitment to Saudi Airlines 
did not play a mediating role between safety culture and safety performance as measured 
by self-reports of pilot error behavior and pilot attitude to violations (Alsowayigh, 2014).  
However, it did reveal that safety culture was a statistically significant predictor of the 
pilot commitment to the airline (Alsowayigh, 2014). 
 
Ethics 
 “Ethics is the area of philosophy that deals with values and customs of a person or 
society—essentially how one determines what is right or wrong.  As far back as Aristotle, 
ethics has been considered a fundamental driving force of human behavior” (Kapp & 
Parboteeah, 2008, p. 28).  Despite being labeled a fundamental driving force of human 
behavior, there are relatively few studies about ethics as a construct and the role it plays 
in the behavior of employees (Freiwald, 2013; Kapp & Parboteeah, 2008).   
 The question of what is and what is not ethical is often judged by others.  There 
are numerous popular media references to stories of politicians, professionals, athletes, 
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and average citizens who commit acts that are judged by the writers to be wrong or 
unethical (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005).  The concept used in this research to 
determine what is right/ethical or wrong/unethical is closest to the rule-based 
utilitarianism concept (Rachels, 2002).  Those acts that are considered wrong or unethical 
are the ones that primarily benefit the person committing the acts while at the same time 
actually or potentially harming others (Rachels, 2002).  Those acts that are considered 
altruistic and benefit others or society as much as or more than the person committing the 
acts are considered right or ethical (Rachels, 2002).   
 There are rare acts that may benefit others far more than, or even risk injury to, 
the person committing the acts; these acts are considered supererogatory, such as entering 
a burning building to search for those in need of help (Craig & Gustafson, 1998; 
Freiwald, 2013).  Supererogatory acts are considered above and beyond what society 
considers socially responsible, just, or ethical behavior; therefore, acts do not have to be 
supererogatory to be considered ethical or right for the purposes of this research.    
 
Ethical Leadership 
 Ethical leadership is “the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct 
through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such 
conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision-
making” (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005, p. 120).  Ethical leadership is a dimension 
of both ethics and leadership.  In the literature, there has been little empirical research 
into either the construct of ethical leadership or the outcomes influenced by ethical 
leadership (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Craig & Gustafson, 1998; Freiwald, 
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2013).  The construct of ethical leadership was researched by Howell and Avolio in 1992, 
though their research focused primarily on charismatic leadership.  Their results 
supported the theory that ethical leaders were those willing to listen to subordinates, and 
unethical leaders refused to listen to them (Howell & Avolio, 1992).  Other research 
studies have showed that employees who perceive their leaders to have high ethical 
standards are more willing to report problems without fear of reprisal (Brown et al., 
2005).    
 Ethical leaders are considered to be altruistic as judged by their employees; these 
ethical leaders are the ones acting for the betterment of others, such as other employees 
(Brown et al., 2005).  The literature has shown that leaders should be concerned with 
their employees’ view of their ethics (Craig & Gustafson, 1998).  If their employees view 
these leaders as “attractive, credible, and legitimate” (Brown et al., 2005, p. 120), their 
actions and behaviors will be emulated by their subordinates.  A separate article stated 
these leaders need to have and maintain a high level of integrity (Craig & Gustafson, 
1998).  If leaders maintain these qualities, they will hold their employees’ attention and 
influence their behavior (Brown et al., 2005). 
 
Ethical Leadership Scale (ELS) 
 The ethical leadership scale (ELS) is a survey instrument that was developed by 
Brown, Treviño, and Harrison in 2005.  Their hypothesis stated ethical leadership was an 
important component of both transformational and charismatic leadership (Brown et al., 
2005).  The ethical leadership component is the one that relates to the ability of the leader 
to inspire, and influences to what degree employees want to emulate the leader’s behavior 
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(Brown et al., 2005).  Brown et al. demonstrated that the construct of ethical leadership 
influenced behavioral outcomes such as job satisfaction, dedication, or commitment to 
the organization and the employee’s willingness to communicate issues (Brown et al., 
2005). 
 Brown, Treviño, and Harrison developed the ELS by initially researching the 
existing literature for extant measurement instruments of charismatic, transformational, 
and ethical leadership.  The researchers independently developed two versions of a 
measurement instrument before subsequently comparing them and eliminating their 
overlap (Brown et al., 2005).  The researchers then conducted in-depth interviews with 20 
MBA students with professional work experience (Brown et al., 2005) to further refine 
the ELS.  The initial result was a 48-item survey instrument on a five point Likert scale 
that measured ethical leadership.  
 Brown, Treviño, and Harrison conducted seven studies with the ELS.  Study one 
was conducted on 154 MBA students that were, on average, 29.3 years of age, 68.9% 
male, and had 6.3 years of professional work experience (Brown et al., 2005).  After 
Brown et al. conducted an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), principal factor analysis, 
with an oblique rotation (direct oblimin), and scree plot, the eigenvalues showed one 
primary factor accounted for 60.1% of the variation (Brown et al., 2005).  Further 
analysis and consultation with construct experts revealed the ELS could be reduced to a 
10-item scale with little loss of explanatory power (Brown et al., 2005).  Studies three 
through six were conducted with the revised 10-item ELS.  The tests included CFA and 
discriminant analysis that contributed to the confirmation that the ELS had both construct 
and discriminant validity.  Study seven was conducted with the ELS and included 
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structural equation modeling (SEM) for the analysis of in-group agreement.  The results 
indicated the ELS predicted several items, including the employees’ willingness to report 
problems to leadership (Brown et al., 2005).        
 
Ethics as a Predictor of Behavior 
 The literature on the relationship between ethics and safety performance has not 
been clearly defined or well researched (Freiwald, 2013; Kapp & Parboteeah, 2008).  
There is a belief that management has an ethical obligation to maintain safety (Erikson, 
1997).  Research has suggested that if employees believe that management values safety, 
then safety performance is enhanced (Erikson, 1997).  Other studies have asserted that 
ethical climate has a strong influence on safety behavior (Kapp & Parboteeah, 2008).  
Freiwald’s (2013) research showed a strong positive relationship between ethical 
leadership and workplace injuries.  The results of the survey and subsequent SEM 
showed a statistically significant relationship between employees’ perceptions of ethics in 
their company leadership and fewer injuries (Freiwald, 2013).  Additionally, Brown, 
Treviño, and Harrison’s ELS (2005) demonstrated the ability to predict the employee’s 
willingness to discuss problems with organizational leadership (Brown et al., 2005).    
 
Criterion or Self-Reported Outcomes 
 There are many studies in the literature that support the theory that safety climate 
influences safety behavior, though some concerns exist about possible confounding 
variables.  Theoretically, the relationship between safety climate and safety behavior may 
be caused by other factors such as the social exchange theory (Vroom, 1964) where the 
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company’s concern for the employees is reciprocated through the employees trying to 
provide value in return by adhering to safety policies or alternately, by the expectancy-
valance theory where the employees want to participate in the safety program due to a 
belief that it will lead to an outcome valuable to themselves (Neal & Griffin, 2006).  
Additionally, there were other concerns in the literature about reverse causality in the 
relationship between safety climate and safety behavior / safety performance, though the 
reverse causality concerns were rejected by both Clarke (2006) and Neal and Griffin 
(2006).     
 Despite the aforementioned concerns, there have been a series of safety climate or 
safety culture studies that indicate a strong and statistically significant relationship 
between safety climate or culture and safety behavior (Neal & Griffin, 2006; O’Toole, 
2002).  These results have led to an ongoing debate on the superiority of criterion-based 
safety outcomes versus self-reported safety outcomes.   
 In 2000, Zohar wrote that safety climate research was being hampered by a lack 
of criterion data (Zohar, 2000).  Johnson’s study in 2007 supported the predictive validity 
of safety climate as characterized by criterion data.  More recently, both Freiwald (2013) 
and Alsowayigh (2014) supported the concept that safety culture influenced directly or 
indirectly self-reported injuries and safety performance, respectively.  Both 
methodologies have their merits and their issues.  The concern with criterion-based 
reports is that there is bias in the reporting, where many minor occurrences such as 
smaller injuries or minor violations can go unreported, therefore tainting the results 
(Thompson et al., 1998).  These minor occurrences have the potential to be leading 
indicators for a decline in safety performance, but only if reported (Thompson et al., 
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1998).  Self-reported survey results on safety climate also may contain bias from the 
respondents based on having been in an accident or witnessing one (Neal & Griffin, 
2006).  
 
Criterion Based Outcomes in Aviation 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Safety Management Continuum.  (Stolzer et al., 2011, p. 235). 
 
 
 
 There are several scholars such as Zohar and O’Connor et al. that support 
quantitative criterion data superiority versus forms of data such as survey results from 
self-reports of errors or violations.  Zohar’s (2000) research on micro-accidents was 
evidence of the predictive value of safety climate, though the researcher relied upon 
smaller accidents that were properly documented.  Thompson et al. (1998) suggests that 
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many smaller accidents go unreported, which has the potential to bias future studies 
without the controls employed by Zohar.   
 In Figure 3, Stolzer and Goglia’s Safety Management Continuum illustration 
(Stolzer & Goglia, 2015, p. 2015) shows that in an SMS, many of the sources of data are 
criterion based.  Examples include data from flight data analysis / FOQA, most of the 
predictive sources of data from data mining, probabilistic risk assessment, and modeling 
are inherently criterion-based data that are quantitative and not self-reported.  O’Connor 
et al. also suggested FOQA would be a possible criterion data source for the prediction of 
aviation accidents (O’Connor et al., 2011).  Despite the potential benefits, FOQA data in 
general aviation aircraft can be very expensive (Mitchell, Sholy, & Stolzer, 2007), and 
the use of data from those devices would raise many privacy and autonomy concerns.     
 O’Connor, et al. stated the accident event rate in aviation is already too low to 
generate valid predictive models based solely on accidents themselves (O’Connor et al., 
2011); therefore, aviation needs reliable and affordable measures of the deterioration of 
safety performance before the chain of events that leads to accidents begins.   
 
Criterion Measurement Variability and Reliability   
 Criterion, or hard quantitative based data, is unlikely to be comprised of 
comparable measurements across diverse aviation organizations.  The measurements of 
parameters will be calibrated differently and therefore have different meaning from 
organization to organization.  For example, the accelerometer is designed to measure the 
amount of gravity or g-forces applied to the aircraft upon landing.  During one study 
conducted by Cistone et al. (2011), many inconsistencies were discovered in the 
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measurement of the g-forces experienced by one airline’s fleet.  The variability of the 
measurements, even within a single aviation organization, was such that it made it 
difficult to derive valid results.  Sources of variability included that accelerometers were 
not all placed on the aircraft in the same location, the levels of calibration varied from 
accelerometer to accelerometer, and the manufacturer of the accelerometers varied.  
Additionally, the variation among aircraft types and the different levels of g-force 
tolerance for those different types made cross comparisons of the importance of specific 
g-force measurements significantly more difficult.  This example illustrates the challenge 
of deriving useful comparable data even when measurements were all conducted within 
the same aviation organization. The same type of research, if attempted across many 
diverse aviation organizations with over 100 different aircraft types, would suffer even 
more from this problem.  Therefore, a useful cross comparison of hard data on some 
measures may be nearly impossible.    
 
Self-Reporting Outcomes 
 Many studies have shown that safety climate either directly or indirectly 
influences both self-reported and criterion-measured safety behavior.  Alsowayigh (2014) 
and Freiwald’s (2013) research results supported safety culture / climate and ethical 
leadership as a viable mechanism to predict self-reported safety outcomes.  Clarke (2006) 
concluded that safety culture predicted safety performance, and safety performance was a 
valid and generalizable predictor of accidents when accident involvement was measured 
after the safety climate measurement. 
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Consistent Methodology 
 O’Connor et al. (2011) have suggested as a best practice that researchers use 
consistent measurements in order to compare results with similar themes.  Yet, there are 
few replicated studies in the literature conducted regarding safety culture and self-
reported safety performance of different organizations such as Fractionals.  This research 
has the potential to re-confirm the relationship of safety culture, pilot commitment to 
their organization, and safety performance of similar organizations.  This cross 
comparison would be an inexpensive measure to implement and monitor, yet the findings 
could have a meaningful impact on improving safety in other U.S. jet FAR 135 
companies. 
 
Hypotheses 
A structural equation model was used to evaluate the relationship among the 
variables used in this study.  Previous studies found in the extant literature were analyzed 
to develop the conceptual framework for the model.  This study augments previous work 
by evaluating the relationship of safety culture with pilot commitment to the 
organization, ethical leadership and self-reported safety performance.  The assumptions 
were based on the findings from the more recent studies by Alsowayigh (2014) and 
Freiwald (2013), though the foundations of the assumptions date back to long established 
constructs.  The hypotheses shown in Figure 4 were tested in this research.  
 𝐻1: A positive safety culture has a positive influence on pilot commitment to the 
 organization. 
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 Safety culture was found to have a direct and significant influence over pilot 
commitment to the airline in the Alsowayigh (2014) study.  This relationship is likely to 
remain consistent with the pilots of the U.S. jet Fractionals.      
 𝐻2: A positive safety culture has a positive influence on ethical leadership.   
 𝐻3: A positive safety culture has a negative influence on safety performance.   
 The findings from Alsowayigh (2014) showed there was no significant direct 
effect between safety culture and pilot error behavior.  Previous research (Alsowayigh, 
2014) has shown a significant and direct negative relationship between safety culture and 
own attitude to violations.  The same research also demonstrated the relationship between 
safety performance and safety culture was not mediated by pilot commitment to the 
airline (Alsowayigh, 2014).  The relationship in this study is unlikely to be mediated by 
the Fractional pilot commitment to the organization. 
 𝐻4: A positive pilot commitment to the organization has a positive influence on 
safety performance.   
 Previous research (Alsowayigh, 2014) has shown that pilot commitment to the 
airline did not have a significant relationship with the pilot’s performance in the cockpit.  
Alsowayigh (2014) suggested that safety performance in the cockpit was driven by their 
professionalism as a pilot.     
 𝐻5: A positive ethical leadership has a negative influence on safety performance.  
 Ethical leadership has been shown to be related to the safety outcomes 
subcomponent of safety climate construct (Freiwald, 2013).  This study has the potential 
to find a relationship between ethical leadership and safety performance. 
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 𝐻6: A positive ethical leadership has a positive influence on pilot commitment to 
 the organization.  
 Ethical leadership has been correlated to employee commitment to the 
organization (Trevino et al., 1998).  This study has the potential to find a relationship 
between ethical leadership and pilot commitment to the organization. 
 
Hypothesized SEM Model  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Hypothesized SEM Model. 
 
 
 
Summary 
 There exists a material gap in the literature of research focused on Fractional and 
Charter jet operations.  Fractional and Charter operations are dissimilar to airline 
H4 H1 
H2 
H3 
H5 
H6 
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operations in several key areas.  One such area is the amount of airports served by 
Fractional and Charter far exceeds those served by the airlines.  This means that 
Fractional and Charter operators often use second and third tier airports that have shorter 
runways with less safety equipment and possibly no operating control tower.  Another 
area that is dissimilar to most airline operations many Fractional and Charter flights 
encounter is autonomy.  This means the pilots for many Fractionals and Charters perform 
the majority of their duties autonomously without the benefit of direct supervision. 
 There is an opportunity to advance aviation research using consistent 
methodologies (O’Connor et al., 2011) through the study of corporate jet operations.  
There are distinct differences in the historical safety performance between Fractionals 
and Charters despite operating under similar FAA regulations.  This study determined a 
baseline of safety culture and ethical leadership for the Fractionals.  These baselines can 
be used in future research to search for differences between Fractionals and Charters to 
begin to draw inferences of causation.  If causal inferences can be drawn and operational 
changes enacted, the historical safety gap between these two groups can potentially be 
narrowed.  In addition to safety in corporate jets being enhanced, the lessons learned may 
be applied to other sectors of aviation. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
A review of the available literature on safety culture, ethical leadership, and safety 
performance supports that structural equation modeling (SEM) is an appropriate method 
to determine the relationships among variables and is an effective means of investigating 
the hypotheses of this study.  Freiwald (2013) used this approach in the determination of 
the relationship among ethical workplace climate, safety climate, and occupational 
injuries.  SEM was also employed by Alsowayigh (2014) when establishing the 
relationship among safety culture, pilot commitment to the airline, and safety 
performance.   
 
Research Approach 
 SEM is a methodology that tests hypotheses in a confirmatory manner.  The 
underlying regression equations in SEM determine a structure to the relationships under 
study and display these relationships graphically for better understanding.  SEM tests 
these hypothesized relationships simultaneously.  If the model is adequate, the underlying 
relationships may be determined to be both directional and possibly causal.  SEM is used 
for confirmatory analysis and not for exploratory analysis (Byrne, 2010).           
The naming of the factors was based on the previous construct names used in the 
literature, abbreviated due to the space constraints, and adapted for improved recognition.  
As shown in Table 1, the exogenous variable is Safety Culture, and the endogenous 
variables are Pilot Commitment to Aircraft Management Company (AMC), Ethical 
Leadership, and Safety Performance. 
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Table 1 
Study Variables 
Variable Dimension Abbreviation Description 
Exogenous Variable 
Safety 
Culture 
Organizational 
Commitment 
OC 
How the AMC values 
safety and if the AMC 
goes above and beyond 
the minimum 
requirements.  
Operations 
Personnel 
OP 
This evaluates AMC 
personnel (chief pilot, 
dispatch, trainers). 
Informal 
Safety System 
IS 
This evaluates the 
support and 
encouragement among 
AMC pilots toward 
safety. 
Formal Safety 
System 
FS 
This rates the safety 
reporting and feedback 
loop and AMC's safety 
personnel. 
Endogenous Variables 
Ethical 
Leadership 
Ethical 
Leadership 
EL 
This evaluates the 
perception of AMC 
leadership's moral and 
ethical behavior. 
    
Pilot 
Commitment 
to AMC 
Pilot 
Commitment 
to AMC 
PC 
This evaluates the 
pilot's willingness to go 
above and beyond for 
the AMC. 
    
Safety 
Performance 
Pilot Error 
Behavior 
ER 
This is a self-report of 
mistakes made by AMC 
pilots during operations. 
Pilot Own 
Attitude 
Toward 
Violations 
AT 
This is a self-report of 
AMC pilot's attitude 
toward the regulations 
and their willingness to 
bend the rules. 
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Design and Procedures   
The survey instrument was modeled after the instrument in the Alsowayigh 
(2014) study with minor adaptations to adapt from commercial aviation to general 
aviation vernacular.  The ELS was added to the end of the survey to preserve the question 
order from the Alsowayigh (2014) study.  The survey was constructed and facilitated in 
Survey Monkey® online service.  The Survey Monkey® online service was selected based 
on previous studies found in the literature.   
All pilots who were invited to take the research survey and allowed access to the 
research survey were verified with FAA records to hold an Airline Transport Pilot 
certificate (ATP), a current First Class Medical certificate, and a type rating consistent 
with those aircraft types flown by U.S. Fractional companies.  The prequalification 
process (Pre-Qual) included verifying the credentials of each respondent before the 
respondents were allowed access to the survey.   
Prior to employment at Flight Options, Flexjet, and Net Jets, each pilot was 
required to meet the aforementioned minimum pilot standards.  Therefore, all Fractional 
pilots on the union message boards met the Pre-Qual standard and were allowed 
immediate access to the research survey.  
A separate pre-qualification survey was set up in Survey Monkey® requiring 
pilots who did not undergo the Pre-Qual process to provide their name, home town, level 
of medical certificate, level of pilot certificate, and type ratings held.  A research assistant 
verified the credentials for each pre-qualification survey respondent with the FAA 
database.  If the respondent’s answers were not verified, the respondent was not sent the 
research survey. 
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The Fractional pilots who were invited to take the research survey by direct mail 
and ERAU alumni emails were pre-qualified by a research assistant prior to receiving the 
invitation to participate.  These pre-qualified pilots who opted to participate were allowed 
immediate access to the research survey. 
There were three other sources of pilots who volunteered to participate in the 
research study.  Aviation International News (AIN) has a bi-weekly newsletter that ran 
three solicitations in its newsletter asking Fractional pilots to participate in a research 
study.  Of the estimated 1,000 plus Fractional pilots who may have seen the solicitation, 
50 pilots were verified through the Pre-Qual process and invited to take the research 
survey.  Of the pilots who passed the Pre-Qual process, 37 completed the research 
survey.  This process was repeated in the Flight Safety Information (FSI) newsletter, 
where 20 additional fractional pilots volunteered to participate, 8 pilots passed the Pre-
Qual process, and 6 pilots completed the survey.  In addition to the newsletter 
solicitations, a former Flight Safety Instructor for Net Jets invited several current Net 
Jets’ pilots to take the survey.  The pilots who responded were required to go through the 
Pre-Qual process before taking the research survey.     
All pilots who volunteered to participate were directed to an informed consent 
form (see Appendix B) prior to taking the survey.  The pilots who consented were 
prompted to also confirm their position as a current Fractional pilot for a U.S. based 
Fractional program.  The survey was constructed to terminate if the pilot did not confirm 
his or her current status as a pilot at a U.S. Fractional AMC.  The pilots then continued to 
the demographics portion of the survey and were then asked to provide their perceptions 
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of their company’s safety culture, their own commitment to the organization, ethical 
leadership qualities of their organization, and their safety performance. 
The survey software was constructed to limit the pilots to one answer for each 
item within the instrument.  All incomplete surveys were excluded from the study.  The 
data received through the Survey Monkey® software were exported directly to IBM SPSS 
23 software for further analysis.  A confirmatory factor analysis and full structural 
equation model were conducted with IBM AMOS 23.   
 
Apparatus and Materials   
The survey was facilitated electronically and could be taken on most smart 
phones, tablets, or computers.  The survey was developed, delivered, and data were 
collected through the Survey Monkey® online platform.  The survey consisted of 93 total 
questions.  The response to the first question determined if the respondent was qualified 
to participate in the study.  The subsequent five questions were demographic questions 
referring to the primary aircraft flown, year of birth, company position, flight experience, 
and tenure with the AMC.  The remaining 87 questions were adapted from previously 
validated surveys with necessary modifications to adapt from commercial aviation 
vernacular to that of general aviation.  The last question was added based on a question 
inserted in the Alsowayigh (2014) research, and because it applied similarly to this study.      
 
Population/Sample 
The population of Fractional jet pilots in the United States, as shown in Table 2, is 
estimated to be 3,660, with 3,425 of those pilots being unionized.  This estimate is based 
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on a ratio of 6.1 pilots per aircraft managed by the Fractional companies.  These figures 
are derived from the ratio of union members to aircraft managed by their respective 
Fractional companies.  NetJets is the largest Fractional company with 429 aircraft in the 
United States (JetNet Fractional Program Summary, 2015) with an estimated 2,700 pilots.  
Net Jets’ pilots are unionized, and an estimated 2,690 (99.8%) are represented by the Net 
Jets Association of Shared Aircraft Pilots (NJASAP).  Flight Options has 60 aircraft in 
the United States with an estimated 385 pilots.  Flight Options’ pilots are unionized with 
an estimated 380 (99%) that are represented by the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters #1108.  FlexJet was recently acquired by Flight Options and has 66 aircraft in 
the United States with 350 pilots.  FlexJet and Flight Options’ pilots voted to unionize in 
December of 2015, and the FlexJet pilots became members of the Flight Options’ union 
(IBT 1108).  The remaining Fractional pilots are employed at Executive AirShare and 
several small regional Fractional programs, which have an estimated total of 150 
additional non-union Fractional jet pilots.   
 
 
 
Table 2 
Fractional Pilots in U.S. 
 
NetJets 429 2,700 2,690
FlexJet 63 380 375
Flight Options 60 370 360
Executive Airshare 27 167 0
Others in U.S. 7 43 0
Total 586 3,660 3,425
* Estimated based on 6.1 average pilots per jet ratio
Jets in 
Fleet
Union 
Members
*Pilots
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The sampling frame consisted of an estimated minimum of 3,460 Fractional 
pilots.  There were the 3,425 union pilots who have access to their union message boards 
plus an additional 35 Fractional pilots who were contacted directly through U.S. mail 
(See Appendix F) or email.  Each of the 3,460 pilots had a non-zero chance of 
participating in the research survey.  The sampling frame, therefore, consisted of 95.2% 
or more of U.S. Fractional pilots.  The remaining 4.8% (175 pilots) of Fractional pilots 
may have seen the multiple invitations in both Aviation International News (AIN) alerts 
and / or the Flight Safety Information Newsletter.  Due to these newsletter invitations, 
many of the remaining non-union Fractional pilots had a non-zero chance to participate in 
the survey, therefore minimizing coverage error (Dillman et al., 2009).      
The SEM methodology requires the sample size to vary with the complexity of 
the model under study (Westland, 2010).  Determination of the appropriate sample size 
for the SEM model is non-trivial (Westland, 2010) and must meet the requirements 
considered acceptable in the available literature.  Presented in Table 3 are several 
researchers and their suggested sample sizes based on the hypothesized SEM in this 
study.  This study has 87 observed variables and 10 latent variables with a targeted 
significance level of .05 (p = .05), effect size of .1, and statistical power of .8.  The 
sample size based on the majority of the literature is 200 respondents or greater.  The 
current study has over 300 completed and valid responses (n = 305).  The current study’s 
sample size of 305 responses satisfies the requirements of Ding et al.’s (1995) (n = 150), 
Kline’s (2005) (n > 200), and Boomsma & Hoogland (2001) (n > 200) as shown in Table 
3. 
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Table 3 
SEM Sample Size Requirements 
 
    Researcher(s)   Year 
N: 100-150  Ding, Velicer, and Harlow,            1995 
N: > 200   Kline             2005 
N: > 200  Boomsma & Hoogland           2001 
N: 579 to 3,231 Westland               2010 
 
 
 
Sources of the Data 
The data used in this study were obtained through the online survey responses 
received by pilots who volunteered to complete the survey.  The survey is a compilation 
of five different instruments.  The survey questions seen by the respondents are displayed 
in Appendix B.   
The respondents from electronic solicitations were presented a link in a 
newsletter, email, or on their union message board.  The respondents from the post card 
in Appendix F were directed to a web domain (www.safetyculturesurvey.org) that 
connected them to the research survey.  All respondents provided their informed consent, 
shown in Appendix B, before advancing to the research survey.  No direct emails of any 
of the recipients were provided by any of the organizations targeted for this study.  Union 
members posted a direct link to the survey on their union message boards.  Additional 
controlled invitations were sent via direct email, email, a posted link on controlled 
websites, or electronic newsletters.         
Prior to conducting this research, initial training from the Collaborative 
Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) was completed and an application was submitted 
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to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.  The 
application received approval prior to start of data collection.  The IRB approval letter is 
presented in Appendix A. 
 
Data Collection Device / Survey Design 
The study included six demographic variables plus 87 observed variables (see 
Appendix B) that represented ten constructs that were derived from five instruments that 
had been used extensively in the literature.  The instruments were:  
 
Safety culture (SC).  The Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS) was 
developed and validated by Gibbons et al. (2006).  Initially, the instrument was an 84 
item scale that consists of five constructs; however, during validation, the instrument was 
reduced to a 55 item scale with four constructs.  Each question is measured using a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  The main 
factors include organizational commitment (OC), operational personnel (OP), formal 
safety systems (FS), and informal safety system (IS) (Gibbons et al. 2006).  
Organizational commitment (OC) items include, “management expects pilots to push for 
on-time performance, even if it means compromising safety.”  Operational personnel 
(OP) items include, management “inappropriately uses the MEL (e.g., use when it would 
be better to fix equipment).”  Formal safety systems (FS) items include, “the safety 
reporting system is convenient and easy to use.”  Informal safety system (IS) items 
include, “management shows favoritism for certain pilots.”      
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Pilot commitment to AMC (PC).  The Organizational Commitment 
Questionnaire (OCQ) was initially developed by Porter et al. (1974) and has two 
versions: a long and short version.  The long version has 15 questions and is multi-
dimensional, whereas the short version, which is recommended by Commerias and 
Fournier (2001), has 9 questions and is considered uni-dimensional.  The questions are 
measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree).  Items include, “I talk up this organization to my friends as a great organization to 
work for,” and this aircraft management company “inspires the best in me in the way of 
job performance.”  
 
Ethical leadership (EL).  The ethical leadership scale (ELS) was developed by 
Brown et al. (2005) and originally consisted of 48 items.  After Brown et al. (2005) 
conducted Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), the ELS was reduced to a 10 item 
instrument.  This instrument used a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 
(Strongly Agree).  Items include, management “makes fair and balanced decisions” and 
management “can be trusted.” 
 
Pilots’ own attitude to violations (AT).  The own attitude to violation scale was 
developed by Fogarty (2004) as a self-reported scale and included nine items.  These 
items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale.  Items include, “bending a procedure is 
not the same as breaking it” (Fogarty, 2004).   
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Pilot error behavior (ER).  The error scale questionnaire was developed by 
Fogarty (2004) and included three items.  This survey was initially developed as a self-
reported scale for airline maintenance personnel.  Alsowayigh stated, “The questions are 
general and can be applied to airline pilots” (Alsowayigh, 2014, p .38).  The questions are 
measured on a 5-point Likert scale.  Items include, “I make errors in my job from time to 
time” (Fogarty, 2004).         
 
Construct Validity 
The items in the study were measured to confirm they represented the latent 
constructs they were expected to measure based on the available literature (Hair et al., 
2010).  The four components of construct validity are Convergent, Discriminant, Face, 
and Nomological (Hair et al., 2010).  The model diagnostics of each component was 
tested in this study. 
The five instruments selected to create the composite instrument in this research 
have all have been used repeatedly in the literature.  Each instrument has had its construct 
validity demonstrated in the literature, and many of these instruments have been used in 
multiple studies.   
 
Convergent validity.  There are several measures used to estimate the convergent 
validity of the items in a research study (Hair et al., 2010).  The factor loadings and 
average variance extracted (AVE) were each checked in the model (Hair et al., 2010).   
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The AVE is a summary measure of convergent validity, and the formula is shown 
in Figure 5.  The standardized factor loadings for each item on each construct were 
squared and then a construct average variance was established (Hair et al., 2010).   
 
 
     
AVE = 
∑ 𝜆𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
 
Figure 5.  Average Variance Extracted (Hair et al., 2010). 
 
 
  
Reliability.  Reliability was tested using Cronbach’s alpha (1951).  Before 
inclusion in the study, each of the five instruments employed to create the composite 
survey was previously tested for internal consistency.  In each case, the instruments used 
in this study satisfied the minimum suggested value of .7 (Hair et al., 2006) as measured 
by Cronbach’s alpha (1951), with the exception of the pilot error scale, which had been 
measured at .6 in one study (Fogarty, 2004).   
In recent SEM studies, construct reliability (CR) has been tested by comparing the 
square of the summed standardized factor loadings with the error variances (Hair et al., 
2010) for each factor as shown in Figure 6.  CR values over .7 suggest good reliability 
(Hair et al., 2010).   
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Figure 6.  Construct Reliability Formula (Hair et al., 2006, p. 777). 
 
 
            
Discriminant validity.  The discriminant validity is a measure by which each 
construct is truly distinct (Hair et al., 2010).  This is tested through a comparison of the 
variance-extracted percentages of two constructs with the squared correlation between the 
two constructs.  (Hair et al., 2006).  Kline (2005) suggested that a model has discriminant 
validity if no two factors have correlations higher than .85.        
 
Nomological & face validity.  Nomological validity was analyzed by reviewing 
the correlations between the constructs to determine if they made sense (Hair et al., 
2010).  The face validity was analyzed by a review of the content of the items in each 
construct to ensure they measured what was intended.  Face validity of the items of each 
construct was also analyzed by two experienced general aviation pilots.  These two pilots 
had a combined experience of more than 40 years and had both been employed in a 
Fractional program.              
 
Treatment of the data 
Demographic Data.  Descriptive statistics were computed from the survey data 
based on pilot tenure at the AMC, weight of equipment flown, position, and age.  The 
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pilot demographic data were also collected for potential inclusion in future research to 
compare group differences. 
 
Missing data.  The survey was constructed to require one answer for each 
question prior to continuing the survey.  A not applicable choice was not presented in the 
instrument.  All 52 incomplete responses were excluded from the analysis; therefore, 
there were no surveys with missing data used in the study.          
 
Outliers.  The Mahalanobis distance (D2) was calculated for each of the variables 
searching for significant outliers.  The literature suggests that outliers should be retained 
unless their retention is particularly detrimental to the model (Hair et al., 2006).  The 
model was tested with and without the outliers, and the model fit deteriorated with the 
outliers removed.  The determination was made to retain all significant outliers in the 
model. 
 
Normality.  Multivariate normality was analyzed with particular consideration for 
kurtosis because SEM is sensitive to kurtosis (Byrne, 2010).  In the assessment of 
multivariate normality, items that were determined to be more than slightly skewed 
(>1.0) or kurtotic (> 7.0) (Byrne, 2010) were evaluated.  The content of these non-normal 
items was reviewed and a determination of their importance to the model was made.  
Items that were non-normal, contributed little to the model, and their temporary removal 
benefitted the model fit were permanently removed from the study.   
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
CFA was used to confirm the latent variables for each of the 10 factors in the 
model (Byrne, 2010).  The CFA was conducted with IBM SPSS AMOS 23 software in 
order to validate the measurement model and confirm the factors measured as intended 
(Byrne, 2010).  The model was checked for covariance, outliers, and cross-loading.  
Model re-specification was conducted by changing one item per iteration.   
The model was evaluated using Normed Fit Index (NFI), Goodness of Fit Index 
(GFI), Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and normed Chi-square (CMIN/df) (Byrne, 
2010).  According to Vandenberg and Scarpello (1990), the fitness of a model should be 
analyzed with more than one fitness index, so the NFI, GFI, AGFI, CFI, RMSEA, and 
CMIN/df were used in the present study.  
The first analysis of model fit was conducted with the Normed Fit Index (NFI).  
The NFI is a non-centrality based index (Byrne, 2010) that tests the hypothesized model 
against the null hypothesis (Byrne, 2010).  If the NFI analysis returns a value close to .95 
(Byrne, 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999), it is considered a good fit, with values from .90 to 
.949 still considered acceptable.  The NFI has been known to underestimate fit in smaller 
sample sizes (Byrne, 2010); therefore, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) was also used to 
evaluate the model fit. 
The subsequent analysis of model fit was conducted with both the Goodness of 
Fit Index (GFI) and the Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI).  The GFI measures the 
relative amount of variance and covariance in the sample data that the hypothesized 
model can explain (Byrne, 2010).  The GFI was developed to be less sensitive to large 
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sample sizes (Hair et al., 2006).  The AGFI is very similar, except that the AGFI accounts 
for the degrees of freedom in the model (Byrne, 2010).  If the GFI and AGFI indices are 
greater than .9 (> .9), then model fit is considered acceptable (Hair et al., 2006).  The 
closer the value is to 1.0, the better the fit (Byrne, 2010; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993)     
Additional analysis of model fit was conducted with the comparative fit index or 
CFI which, like the NFI, is a non-centrality based index (Byrne, 2010) that tests the 
proposed model against the null hypothesis (Byrne, 2010).  The CFI is chosen frequently 
in studies because it demonstrates insensitivity to model complexity (Hair et al., 2010).  
As with the NFI, if the CFI analysis returns a value close to .95 or greater, it is considered 
a good fit (Byrne, 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999).  If the CFI returns values from .90 to .949, 
the fit is still considered acceptable.   
A further metric employed was the Root Mean Square of Error Approximation 
(RMSEA).  The RMSEA is considered a badness of fit index, which means that lower 
values indicate a better fitting model (Byrne, 2010).  RMSEA is recommended for studies 
with a large number of observed variables because other 𝜒2 Goodness of Fit (GOF) test 
statistics tend to reject acceptable models with a large number of observed variables, such 
as the current study (Hair et al., 2010).  A value of the RMSEA of .6 or below is 
considered a good fit for the data (Byrne, 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
The final fit metric was the 𝜒2 statistic (CMIN/df), which computes the model’s 
distance from a theoretically perfectly fitted model divided by the degrees of freedom 
(Hu & Bentler, 1999).  The lower the CMIN/df value is, the better the model fitness.  The 
chi-square is sensitive to sample size (Hair et al., 2006).  The CMIN/df is a comparative 
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ratio and is considered to be acceptable if value is below three (Byrne, 2010; Hair et al., 
2006). 
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
 The model did not achieve the fit criteria in Table 10; therefore, an EFA was 
conducted on the data (Byrne, 2010).  A principal component analysis (PCA) was 
conducted with Varimax rotation.  The PCA was chosen because the results were 
considered easier to interpret.  The PCA is designed to reduce the number of variables 
down to the items that explain the largest amount of variance in a given model (Grimm et 
al., 2000).  An oblique rotation was considered due to its advantage with cross-loading 
items (Hair et al., 2006); however, the Varimax rotation was selected because it was more 
frequently chosen in the safety culture and safety climate literature, such as Freiwald’s 
(2013) study.  
 The EFA was run, and the Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) measure of sampling 
adequacy was analyzed (Hair et al., 2006).  This is the measure of the ratio of squared 
correlations between variables and the partial squared correlations between variables.  
KMO measures above .9 (> .9) are considered very good (Field, 2009).   
 The Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) was analyzed for the appropriateness 
of conducting an EFA.  All variables (> .5) were considered appropriate (Hair et al., 
2005).  The variables below .5 were removed from the model, and the model was re-run.    
 The EFA was conducted with IBM SPSS 23 software.  All factors that returned 
eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (> 1.0) and had a contribution percentage of greater than 1% 
(> 1%) of the variance in the model (Grimm et al., 2000) were analyzed.  The EFA 
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results displayed many more than the eight first order factors in the proposed model; 
therefore, after evaluation, the model was re-run with a constraint for seven factors.  The 
seven-factor constraint was chosen based on grounded theory to reduce the complexity in 
the model.  All items with similar factor loadings on multiple factors were evaluated for 
removal.  Factors with no basis in grounded theory were analyzed for removal from the 
study. 
 
Model 2 (M2) Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
 The CFA was conducted on M2 model.  Based on a review of the available 
literature, the M2 constructs were evaluated against the validated instruments chosen for 
the study.  Based on grounded theory of the latent factor structure, items that were 
loading near or below .7 (Hair et al., 2006), non-normal, or loading on a latent factor not 
supported by previous studies were evaluated for removal.     
 
Post hoc analysis.  Post hoc analysis was conducted based on the Modification 
Indices (MIs).  Model re-specification is by nature exploratory because the researcher is 
re-specifying the hypothesized model for methods to improve the model (Byrne, 2010).  
A model with good fit indices and also with high MIs can be an indication of multi-
collinearity in the model (Kline, 2005) rather than causal significance.  MIs were 
reviewed, and those that exceeded 5.00 were co-varied when on the same factors. 
The CFA for the M2 required additional regressions constraints on each of the 
items in the ERN and ATN constructs.  Hair et al. (2006) recommend the use of at least 
three items for each factor when the sample size is below 300 (n < 300).  There is a 
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concern that factors with less than three items will not have the appropriate level of 
degrees of freedom to determine a solution that fits the data (Hair et al., 2006).  The 
current research study had over 300 (n = 305) completed and valid responses; therefore, 
additional regression constraints were added before conducting the SEM. 
 
Structural Equation Model & Hypotheses Testing  
The previously mentioned model fit indices were re-evaluated by comparing them 
to the model fit in the final CFA and additionally to the fit criteria in Table 10.  The 
model fit in SEM was similar to the final CFA and met all the criteria in Table 10.  The 
AGFI was the only fit criteria below the target level (> .9).  As previously stated, it was 
determined to be acceptable. 
The six hypotheses were evaluated by reviewing the SEM regression weights, 
standardized estimates, and p values.  The analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS 
AMOS 23 software.  The maximum likelihood estimation was employed for the analysis 
(Byrne, 2010).  The elimination of the PC factor in the EFA precluded the testing of three 
of the six hypotheses.  The model fit was determined to be adequate, and the remaining 
three hypotheses were tested.      
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
This study explored the relationship between Safety Culture, Ethical Leadership, 
Pilot Commitment to the AMC, and Safety Performance.  Based on the available 
literature, a model was developed to determine the effect of Safety Culture on Ethical 
Leadership, Pilot Commitment, and Safety Performance.  Additionally, the effect of 
Ethical Leadership on Safety Performance was also tested. 
This chapter shows the results of the CFA on the proposed model, subsequent 
EFA, final CFA, and SEM.  The model fit history of the CFA is shown with nine 
revisions in Table 12 and the SEM model fit shown in Table 14.  The results of the 
hypothesis testing are included in this chapter.  The descriptive statistics for each of the 
items is displayed in Appendix C.  The SC & PC constructs were measured on a seven-
point Likert scale.  The remaining constructs of ER, AT, and EL were each measured on 
a five-point Likert scale.         
 
Demographic Data 
Three hundred fifty-seven respondents participated in the research survey; all 
respondents completed the survey electronically.  Table 4 shows there were 305 (n = 305) 
complete and valid responses used in the study, representing 8.3% of the estimated 3,660 
Fractional jet pilots in the United States.  
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Table 4 
Completed Responses 
Source 
Estimated 
Views Pre-Qual 
Completed 
Surveys Percentage 
Direct Mail to Prequalified Pilots 1,759  All  111  36.4%  
NJASAP Message Board  2,660  All  80  26.2%  
FlexJet/FO Message Board  780  All  46  15.1%  
Aviation International News  1,000  50  37  12.1%  
Embry-Riddle Alumni Email 249  All  16  5.2%  
Flight Safety Instructor 180  9  9  3.0%  
Curt Lewis Newsletter 160   8   6   2.0%   
Total  6,788    305    
 
 
 
Table 5 shows the pilots’ ages ranged from 28 years old to 74 years old, 
representing a range of 46 years between the youngest and oldest pilot.  The median age 
was 49, and the mean age was 49.14 years old.  The proximity of the mean age to the 
median age of the data showed the age data was not skewed.  The mode was 43 years of 
age.   
 
 
 
Table 5 
Pilot Age (Years) 
  Frequency  Percentage  
Cumulative 
Percentage  
20-29 years 1  0.3% 0.3% 
30-39 years 37  12.1% 12.5% 
40-49 years 131  42.9% 55.4% 
50-59 years 97  31.8% 87.8% 
60-69 years 35  11.5% 98.7% 
70-79 years 4   1.3%  100.0%  
Total 305      
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The most frequent position held by 54.8% of the respondents was Pilot In 
Command (PIC), often called Captain, followed by First Officer or Second in Command 
(SIC), which represented 27.8% of the respondents.  Table 6 shows there were 15.4% of 
pilots who were Captains with additional duties such as Check Airman, and 2% of the 
respondents were part of the management team at the AMC. 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Position at AMC 
  Frequency Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
0-4 years 11  3.6%  3.6%  
5-9 years 39  12.8%  16.4%  
10-14 years 121  39.7%  56.1%  
15 or more years 134   43.9%   100.0%   
Total 305       
 
 
 
The type of equipment flown by the pilots in Table 7 was split evenly among 
Light Jet (29.5%), Mid-Sized Jet (25.6%), Super Mid-Sized Jet (24.3%), and Large Jets 
& Long Range Jets (20.7%).  The data contained a well-balanced mix of pilots flying a 
wide range of equipment.       
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Table 7 
Aircraft Type Flown (Max Takeoff Weight) 
  Frequency Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
Light Jet (up to 19,999 lbs) 90  29.5%  29.5%  
Mid-sized Jet (20,000 - 
29,999 lbs) 78  25.6%  55.1%  
Super Mid-sized Jet 
(30,000 - 39,999 lbs) 74  24.3%  79.3%  
Large Jet (40,000 - 49,999 
lbs) 32  10.5%  89.3%  
Long Range (50,000 lbs or 
greater) 31   10.2%   100.0%   
Total 305       
 
 
 
 Table 8 shows the majority of respondents (51.5%) had over 10,000 hours of 
flight experience with 27.5% having between 7,500 and 9,999 hours of flight experience, 
18.7% had between 5,000 and 7,499 hours, and just 2.3% had below 5,000 hours.  In 
contrast to commercial pilots, general aviation pilots do not accumulate flight hours at the 
same pace; therefore, having the majority of pilots with over 10,000 hours of flight 
experience is uncommonly high for a general aviation organization.     
Table 9 shows that 3.6% of respondents had been with their AMC less than 5 
years, 12.8% had been with their AMC between 5-9 years, 39.7% between 10-14 years, 
and 43.9% had been with their respective AMC for 15 years or more.  The tenure with 
the AMC indicates that the Fractional pilots that completed the survey stay with their 
respective companies for many years.  
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Table 8 
Pilot Experience (Hours) 
  Frequency Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
2,500 - 4,999 hours 7  2.3%  2.3%  
5,000 - 7,499 hours 57  18.7%  21.0%  
7,500 - 9,999 hours  84  27.5%  48.5%  
10,000 hours or more  157   51.5%   100.0%   
Total 305       
 
 
 
Table 9 
Tenure at AMC 
  Frequency Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
0-4 years 11  3.6%  3.6%  
5-9 years 39  12.8%  16.4%  
10-14 years 121  39.7%  56.1%  
15 or more 
years 134   43.9%   100.0%   
Total 305       
 
 
 
Normality & Outlier Checks 
 The outliers were checked by analyzing the Mahalanobis D2.  There were 57 cases 
that were considered outliers that were significant to the .05 level (p < .05).  The model 
fit was checked with the outliers, and the model fit indices were CMIN/df = 1.777, NFI = 
.715, GFI = .669, AGFI = .649, CFI = .85, and RMSEA = .051.  After the outliers were 
removed, the model fit indices deteriorated with CMIN/df = 1.704, NFI = .701, GFI = 
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.637, AGFI = .615, CFI = .849, and RMSEA = .053.  The outliers were retained in all 
future models. 
 The multivariate normality was analyzed, and it was determined there were 
several variables that had a skewness over 1.0 and/or a kurtosis greater than 7.0 (See 
Appendix C).  The content of the items was reviewed, and items critical to the model 
were retained.  ER62 (3.844) (I make errors in my job from time to time.) and ER64 
(4.553) (I have made errors that have been detected by other pilots.) had acceptable, 
though noticeably high kurtosis values.  The content of both questions led to one 
common answer; therefore, kurtosis was to be expected, and the items were retained.  
The remaining non-normal items were retained until the CFA was conducted and the 
model fit analyzed.  If an item was determined to have a combination of loading below .5 
(< .5) (Hair et al., 2006) and high skewness or kurtosis, it was temporarily removed from 
the model.  If the model fit improved after the item was removed, and it was determined 
that the content of the item was not critical to the model, it was removed permanently 
from the model.  
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
In Figure 7, the proposed CFA factor structure is shown with OC, OP, FS, IS, PC, 
EL, AT, and ER.  The proposed model consists of the original 55 items of the CASS 
(Gibbons et al., 2006).  The CASS was hypothesized to have a four-factor structure (OC, 
OP, FS, IS) with a second order factor for SC.  The 9 items of Porter et al.’s PC scale 
(1974), 10 items from the Brown et al. (2005) ELS, and Fogarty’s (2004) Maintenance 
Environment Survey comprised the items in both AT and ER. 
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Figure 7.  Proposed CFA Model. 
 
 
 
The proposed model had model fit indices of CMIN/df = 2.019, NFI = .675, GFI 
= .626, AGFI = .605, CFI = .803, and RMSEA = .058 as displayed in Revision 1 of Table 
12.  The CMIN/df and RMSEA were considered acceptable as shown in the fit criteria in 
Table 10; however, the GFI of .626 was less than the .90 targeted fit criteria, AGFI of 
.605 was less than .90 targeted fit criteria, and CFI of .803 was less than .95 targeted fit 
criteria (Hair et al. 2006).  The Modification Indices (MIs) were checked for values over 
20.  For each of the MI values over 20 that loaded on the same factor, a covariance was 
established.  There were 20 iterations conducted, and the model fit improved, though the 
model fit remained unacceptable.  The model fit indices were CMIN/df = 1.777, NFI = 
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.715, GFI = .669, AGFI = .649, CFI = .85, and RMSEA = .051.  The model was then 
tested with the outliers removed from the data.  After outliers were removed, the model 
fit further deteriorated with CMIN/df = 1.704, NFI = .701, GFI = .637, AGFI = .615, CFI 
= .849, and RMSEA = .053.  The outliers were returned to the data and remained in the 
model. 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Fit Criteria 
 
 
 
 
The items with low factor loadings (< .4) were removed from the model (Byrne, 
2010).  There were 14 additional model revisions conducted to improve the model fit.  
The model fit improved, though the model fit remained unacceptable with values of 
CMIN/df = 1.778, NFI = .77, GFI = .705, AGFI = .683, CFI = .884, and RMSEA = .051.  
The model fit for the proposed model was determined to be unacceptable based on the 
target model fit indices in Table 10.  It was determined that an exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) should be conducted based on the poor model fit.  
 
 
 Model Fit Reference Acceptable
CMIN/df 1.399 below 3.00 (Byrne, 2010; Hair et al., 2006) Yes
NFI 0.939 close to 0.95 (Byrne, 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999) Yes
GFI 0.905 close to 1.00 (Byrne, 2010; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993) Yes
AGFI 0.879 close to 1.00 (Byrne, 2010; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993) Yes
CFI 0.982 close to 0.95 (Byrne, 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999) Yes
RMSEA 0.036 less than 0.60 (Byrne, 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999) Yes
Fit Criteria
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Exploratory Factor Analysis 
The measurement model was analyzed with the survey data collected, and the 
model fit remained unacceptable due to a poor model fit indices.  An EFA was initiated 
on the full dataset.  Before the EFA was conducted, the data was confirmed to meet the 
assumptions for an EFA.  A review of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy (KMO) showed that it was strong at .953.  The Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 
was significant (p < .000).  The Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) was analyzed.  
After the removal of one item (A93); the MSA was determined to be satisfactory because 
a review of the Anti-Image Matrix showed all items were above .5 (>.5).  The KMO also 
improved to .965 after the removal of item A93.  
Based on Hair et al. (2010), a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) with 
Varimax rotation was conducted on all items.  The initial result showed the items loading 
on 16 different factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 which explained 68.3% of the 
variance in the model.  
Based on the proposed model developed from the research conducted by 
Alsowayigh (2014) and Brown et al. (2005), the PCA was run again with a factor 
constraint of seven.  The scree plot in Figure 8 shows the results of the CFA with the 
constraint of seven factors.  The eigenvalues, located in Appendix D1, shows the seven 
factor model explained 67.959% of the variance in the model.  The first component was 
named Safety Culture New (SCN), and it consisted of 24 items from the original Safety 
Culture (SC) second order factor.  The second component was named Ethical Leadership 
Pilot Commitment (ELPC) due to 13 of the 18 items coming from the previous factors of 
Ethical Leadership and Pilot Commitment to the AMC (PC).  The remaining five items 
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were from SC.  The third factor was labeled Pilot Commitment New (PCN) with four low 
loading items exclusively from the previous PC factor.  The fourth component consisted 
of three low loading items from SC and PC.  The fifth component was labeled Reporting 
(REP) and consisted of two items from the original SC factor.  The sixth component was 
labeled Safety Performance 1 (SP1), which consisted of five items from the original 
Attitude To Violations (AT).  The seventh component was labeled Safety Performance 2 
(SP2) and consisted of five items from ER and AT.  
 
 
 
   
Figure 8.  EFA Final Scree Plot.  
 
 
 
After reviewing the loadings below .7 (< .7) alongside item content, further model 
revisions were made.  The third factor (PCN) was removed because the average loading 
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was (below .7) .573, with 25% of the items cross-loading to ELPC.  Factor 4 was 
removed due to low average loading of .566.  Factor 5 (REP) was also removed due to 
poor average factor loading of .573.  Additionally, several items were removed with low 
loading (below .6) or cross-loading concerns.  Cross-loading concerns arise when one 
item has similar loading values on multiple components; this may cause model fit and 
discriminant validity issues.  Items with cross-loading issues were reviewed and removed 
from the model. 
The original PC factor was eliminated from the model due to poor factor loading 
and cross-loading concerns.  The elimination of PC reduced the hypotheses in the study 
from six to three.  The remaining factors shown in Table 11 were SCN (20 items), ELPC 
(11 items), ATN (2 items), and ERN (2 items).  The model could still test hypotheses H2, 
H3, and H5. 
 
 
 
Table 11 
Model Factors for Hypothesis Testing 
Proposed Model Model 2 (M2) 
First Order 
Second 
Order 
Factors 
Post EFA 
Factors 
Final 
Factors 
OC 
SC SCN SCN 
OP 
FS 
IS 
EL   
ELPC ELN 
PC   
AT 
SP SP1 NFP 
ER 
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis Model 2 (M2) 
Model 2 (M2) was analyzed with the survey data collected and the model fit 
improved from the model fit in the CFA conducted prior to the EFA; though the model fit 
shown in Table 12 was still not acceptable with CMIN/df = 2.237, NFI = .865, GFI = 
.793, AGFI = .766, CFI = .92, and RMSEA = .064.  The M2 was checked for normality, 
and five items were slightly skewed with skewness values above 1.0.  There was one item 
(OP31) with a skewness of 1.3 that was removed from the model after review of the 
content.  Two items (ER62, ER64) had elevated kurtosis values (> 7.0).  After a review of 
the content, it was determined the format of both items led to a justifiable common 
answer; therefore, the items remained unchanged in the model.  A review of the 
Mahalanobis D² values indicated there were 57 cases where the respondents’ answers 
were outliers and were significant (p < .05).  The model was checked with the outliers 
removed and the model fit eroded; therefore, the outliers remained in the model 
permanently. 
The M2 went through four additional iterations to improve the model fit with 
CMIN/df = 1.93, NFI = .885, GFI = .828, AGFI = .804, CFI = .941, and RMSEA = .055.  
The model fit remained unacceptable.  The proposed factor structure in the literature was 
reviewed, and based on grounded theory, the ELPC factor was reduced to more closely 
match the original EL factor.  The items loading from the former factors of SC and PC 
(PC75, IS48, IS49) were deleted from the ELPC construct.  ELPC was renamed ELN and 
maintained 80% of the items from the EL construct.  After the deletion of these three 
items in ELPC, the model fit continued to improve with CMIN/df = 2.026, NFI = .891, 
GFI = .837, AGFI = .812, CFI = .941, and RMSEA = .055.  
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Three additional items with standardized estimates below .65 were removed from 
the model, and the overall fit improved with CMIN/df = 2.059, NFI = .903, GFI = .848, 
AGFI = .766, CFI = .947, and RMSEA = .059.  The CMIN/df increased slightly from 
2.026 to 2.059, and the RMSEA increased from .055 to .059, though both values were 
still considered good after the items were removed. 
 
 
 
Table 12 
CFA Model Fit History  
Revision CMIN/df NFI GFI AGFI CFI RMSEA 
1 2.019 0.675 0.626 0.605 0.803 0.058 
2 1.777 0.715 0.669 0.649 0.850 0.051 
3 1.778 0.770 0.705 0.683 0.884 0.051 
4 (M2) 2.237 0.865 0.793 0.766 0.920 0.064 
5 1.930 0.885 0.828 0.804 0.941 0.055 
6 2.026 0.891 0.837 0.812 0.941 0.058 
7 2.059 0.903 0.848 0.822 0.947 0.059 
8 1.390 0.940 0.906 0.880 0.982 0.036 
9 1.399 0.939 0.905 0.879 0.982 0.036 
 
 
 
The MIs were analyzed further and adjustments were made to co-vary appropriate 
error terms that exceeded 4.0.  The standardized regressions were analyzed for each of 
the subsequent 29 model revisions to improve the model fit.  The final model fit values 
were CMIN/df = 1.39, NFI = .94, GFI = .906, AGFI = .88, CFI = .982, and RMSEA = 
.035.  According to Byrne (2010), each of the model fit values were acceptable.  The 
AGFI = .88 remained marginal, though concerns with the AGFI under-reporting in 
complex models similar to the model in this current study allowed for the AGFI to be 
deemed acceptable.  
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In Figure 9, the final factor structure is shown with SCN, ELN, and NFP, which is 
a second order factor comprised of ERN and ATN.  The final M2 model consists of one 
first order factor for SCN, which is made up of 17 of the original 55 items of the Gibbons 
et al. (2006) CASS.  The CASS was hypothesized to have a four-factor structure with a 
second order factor for SC.  ELN is made up of 80% of the items from the Brown et al. 
(2005) ELS.  The PC factor was completely removed.  The NFP second order factor 
consists of the remaining four items from the original 12 items in Fogarty’s (2004) 
Maintenance Environment Survey.  A Heywood case (Hair et al., 2006) was discovered 
in the CFA model.  The regression weights for the ERN and ATN were equalized (Hair et 
al., 2006) to allow for the model to run properly.     
 
 
             
 
Figure 9.  Final CFA Model. 
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Construct Reliability 
Each factor was analyzed for construct reliability (CR) using the formula in 
Figure 6.  The CR values for the factors in the model were SCN = .905, ELN = .945, 
ATN = .919, and ERN = .795.  Due to reverse worded items, SCN values were converted 
to absolute numbers prior to calculating the CR value.  The factors in this model all have 
achieved acceptable construct reliability with values greater than .7 (> .7) (Hair et al., 
2010).  The Cronbach’s alpha (1951) for the factors were SCN = .911, ELN = .950, ATN 
= .903, and ERN = .788.  
 
Convergent Validity 
Convergent Validity was calculated using the Average Variance Extract (AVE) 
by taking the standardized factor loading squared for each item in each factor and then 
calculating the average.  The AVE values for the factors in the model were SCN = .599, 
EL = .710, ATN = .823, and ERN = .650.  According to Hair et al. (2010), any factors 
with an AVE greater than .5 are considered to have convergent validity; therefore, all the 
factors in the final model had convergent validity. 
 
Discriminant Validity 
Discriminant Validity was assessed using two methodologies.  The first, shown in 
Table 13, was assessed by comparing the squared factor correlations with the AVE for 
each factor.  The AVE for SCN = .599, and the squared correlations between SCN and 
EL = .677, SCN and ERN = .024, and SCN and ATN = .063.  The AVE for ELN = .710, 
and the squared correlations between SCN and ELN = .677, ELN and ERN = .012, and 
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ELN and ATN = .079.  The AVE for ERN = .650 and the squared correlations between 
ERN and SCN = .024, ERN and ELN = .012, and ERN and ATN = .011.  The AVE for 
ATN = .823 and the squared correlations between ATN and SCN = .063, ATN and ELN 
= .079, and ATN and ERN = .011.  According to Hair et al. (2010), discriminant validity 
within the model was confirmed between all factors except between SCN and ELN.  A 
subsequent methodology was employed to confirm discriminant validity between SCN 
and ELN.  According to Kline (2005), correlations below < .85 are considered to have 
discriminant validity.  The correlation between SCN and ELN was below .85 at .824; 
therefore, the model has discriminant validity (Kline, 2005). 
 
 
 
Table 13 
Discriminant Validity Test 
Factor   AVE. Squared Correlations Confirmed 
SCN 
  
0.599 
0.677 (SCN:ELN) N* 
 0.024 (SCN:ERN) Y 
  0.063 (SCN:ATN) Y 
ELN 
  
0.710 
0.677 (ELN:SCN) Y 
 0.120 (ELN:ERN) Y 
  0.079 (ELN:ATN) Y 
ERN 
  
0.650 
0.024 (ERN:SCN) Y 
 0.120 (ERN:ELN) Y 
  0.011 (ERN:ATN) Y 
ATN 
  
0.823 
0.063 (ATN:SCN) Y 
 0.079 (ATN:ELN) Y 
  0.011 (ATN:ERN) Y 
*Discriminant validity confirmed with alternate 
methodology  
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Structural Equation Model 
 The SEM displayed in Figure 10 shows the proposed relationships of SCN on 
ELN, SCN on NFP, and ELN on NFP.  Due to the removal of the PC factor, three other 
hypotheses were no longer testable in the study and were removed from the SEM. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Final SEM Model. 
 
 
 
Table 14 shows the model fit values for the SEM were acceptable with CMIN/df 
= 1.387, NFI = .94, GFI = .906, AGFI = .881, CFI = .982, and RMSEA = .036. (Hair et 
al., 2010).  These model fit values are similar to the final CFA and as mentioned 
previously, determined to be acceptable.   
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Table 14 
Final SEM Model Fit 
Revision CMIN/df NFI GFI AGFI CFI RMSEA 
SEM 1.399 0.939 0.905 0.879 0.982 0.036 
 
 
 
The results of the EFA reduced the number of factors in the proposed model from 
eight first order factors to four.  The proposed model consisted of four first order factors 
(FS, IS, OP, OC) loading onto one second order factor SC.  After the EFA, SC was 
reduced to one first order factor renamed SCN.  SCN is one first order factor made up of 
17 of the original 55 items from SC.  Of the seventeen items, eight items were from OC, 
five items were from OP, four items were from FS, and zero items remained from IS.  
Two of the items from IS loaded onto the ELPC factor; however, after review of the 
extant research, the two IS items were removed from the factor ELPC.  ELPC was re-
named ELN after the removal of two IS (IS48, IS49) items and removal of one PC item 
(PC75).   
PC was eliminated from the model due to low to moderate loading and cross-
loading on many different factors.  The factor was determined to no longer be testable; 
therefore, it was eliminated.  This elimination of PC from the model precluded the testing 
of Hypotheses H1, H4, and H6 in the SEM model.   
The 33% in ER and 78% in AT factors led to the renaming of the SP second order 
factor to NFP (Not Follow Procedures) based on the content of the items remaining.  EL 
was reduced by 20% and was renamed ELN in the final model. 
In Figure 10, the final factor structure is shown with SCN, ELN, and NFP, which 
is a second order factor comprised of ERN and ATN.  The final SEM model tests the 
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direct relationship between SCN on ELN (𝐻2), SCN on NFP (𝐻3), and ELN on NFP 
(𝐻5). 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1 
𝐻1  A positive Safety culture has a positive influence on pilot commitment to the 
organization. 
 This hypothesis can no longer be tested due to the elimination of the PC factor 
during the EFA.  
 
Hypothesis 2 
𝐻2: A positive safety culture (SCN) has a positive influence on ethical leadership (ELN).   
As shown in Table 15, this hypothesis is supported.   
 
 
 
Table 15 
SEM Hypothesis Testing 
 
 
VAR DIR VAR Std Est S.E. C.R P Supported
H1 n/a
H2 ELN <--- SCN 0.824 0.036 11.565 *** Yes
H3 NFP <--- SCN -0.330 14.910 -1.442 0.149 No
H4 n/a
H5 NFP <--- ELN -0.317 30.471 -1.327 0.184 No
H6 n/a
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The results of the SEM analysis confirmed the relationship between SCN and 
ELN was both strong (Estimate = .824) and significant (p < .001).  This study supports 
that there is a significant relationship and positive relationship between SCN and ELN. 
 
Hypothesis 3  
𝐻3: A positive safety culture (SCN) has a negative influence on safety performance 
(NFP). 
 As shown in Table 15, this hypothesis is not supported.  The results of the SEM 
analysis determined SCN does not have a negative influence on NFP, and that 
relationship is not significant.  The relationship between SCN and NFP did not 
materialize as hypothesized; the relationship between SCN and NFP had a significance 
level of .149.  
 
Hypothesis 4 
𝐻4: A positive pilot commitment to the organization (PC) has a positive influence on 
safety performance (NFP).   
 This hypothesis could no longer be tested due to the elimination of the PC factor 
during the EFA. 
 
Hypothesis 5 
𝐻5: A positive ethical leadership (ELN) has a negative influence on safety performance 
(NFP). 
81 
 
As shown in Table 15, this hypothesis is not supported.  The results of the SEM 
analysis confirmed ELN had a non-significant (p = -.184) and negative relationship to 
NFP.  This result was unexpected based on a review of the literature.   
 
Hypothesis 6 
𝐻6: A positive ethical leadership (ELN) has a positive influence on pilot commitment to 
the organization (PC). 
This hypothesis can no longer be tested due to the elimination of the PC factor 
during the EFA. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study analyzed the relationship between safety culture (SC), ethical 
leadership (EL), pilot commitment to the AMC (PC), and safety performance (SP) for 
U.S. based Fractional jet pilots.  The proposed factor model structure derived from the 
literature could not attain an adequate model fit during the initial CFA; therefore, an EFA 
was conducted.  After the EFA, a second CFA was conducted on M2 followed by the 
development and testing of a SEM.  The SEM developed allowed for hypothesis testing 
based on the new factor structure. 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the results of the study and how these 
results compare with the findings in the available literature.  Additionally, this chapter 
will interpret these results, discuss how these results may impact general aviation in the 
future, and discuss recommendations for future research.      
 
Discussion  
 Hypotheses.  There were six hypotheses planned for this research study.  After 
the EFA, three (H1, H4, H6) of the six hypotheses could no longer be tested due to the 
removal of the PC factor.   
 (𝐻1)  A positive safety culture has a positive influence on pilot commitment to the 
organization.  This hypothesis (𝐻1) could not be tested because of the low and cross 
loading of the PC items as a stand-alone factor.          
 (𝐻2)  A positive safety culture (SCN) has a positive influence on ethical 
leadership (ELN).  This hypothesis was tested and supported.  The results showed H2 had 
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both a significant (p =.001) and strong (estimate = .824) relationship.  These results 
confirm Schein’s (2004) assertion that corporate culture is intertwined with 
organizational leadership.  The high correlation and the inability to confirm one of the 
two discriminant validity tests performed between the SCN and ELN constructs suggest a 
deep relationship between ELN and SCN.  One of the important revelations in this study 
is that in Fractional pilots there exists a strong correlation between ELN and SCN.  There 
is a need for discrimination between these two constructs to better understand how to 
measure, monitor, and improve them respectively, if needed.  Many studies have 
concluded that both EL (Freiwald, 2013) and SC (Alsowayigh, 2014) influence the safety 
of an organization, though the current study did not confirm those conclusions.   
 As noted above, the current study results do not match Freiwald’s (2013) findings 
that ethical leadership (EL) did not have a significant relationship with proactive safety 
climate.  Freiwald’s (2013) reasoning suggested that EL is merely a subset of the larger 
construct of leadership, and Freiwald stated that the narrowness of the EL construct might 
explain the lack of a relationship in the 2013 study (Freiwald, 2013).  Additionally, the 
Freiwald study included EL as the exogenous variable and safety climate as the 
endogenous variable, whereas the present study reverses the direction of that relationship.  
 (𝐻3) A positive safety culture (SCN) has a negative influence on safety 
performance (NFP).  The SEM analysis showed that H3 is not supported, and SCN does 
not have a significant influence on NFP.  This result was unexpected due to the support in 
previous studies (Alsowayigh, 2014; Fogarty, 2004) showing a significant relationship 
between safety culture or safety climate and self-reported safety performance.  Due to the 
infrequency of aviation accidents or incidents potentially leading to invalid conclusions 
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(O’Connor et al., 2011), the current study relied on self-reported safety behavior as did 
Alsowayigh (2014) and Fogarty (2004).  In contrast, research by Zohar (2000) relied on 
quantitative outcome variables, such as employee micro-accidents.  This micro-accident 
research also concluded there was a significant relationship between safety climate and 
safety performance.  Zohar hypothesized that micro-accidents were a leading indicator to 
a decline in safety climate that could lead to larger accidents.  General aviation needs to 
develop a methodology that includes identifying and monitoring quantifiable data that is 
considered a leading indicator of a decline in safety to augment self-reported data.   
 Future research should continue to test the relationship between SCN and NFP 
because the results are likely to be more consistent with past research from Alsowayigh 
(2014), Fogarty (2004), and Zohar (2000).  Freiwald (2013) suggested that the 
narrowness of the EL construct in the 2013 study was a potential cause for the 
unexpected lack of support for the relationship between EL and employee injuries.  In the 
current study, the major reduction in the SP items from 13 original items to 4 items could 
have also narrowed the NFP construct in a similar manner, thereby altering the 
significance of the relationship.  
   (𝐻4) A positive pilot commitment to the organization (PC) has a positive 
influence on safety performance (NFP).  Alsowayigh (2014) found that PC did not 
mediate the relationship between ER and AT.  Alsowayigh (2014) also determined that 
PC did not influence a professional pilot’s behavior in the cockpit.  The inability of the 
PC items to maintain integrity as a factor combined with the results of previous research 
suggests that PC is not essential for future research attempting to predict pilot safety 
behavior.  
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 (𝐻5)  A positive ethical leadership (ELN) has a negative influence on safety 
performance (NFP).  The SEM results did not support that positive ELN reduces the 
likelihood of pilots not following procedures (NFP).  In 1998, Craig and Gustafson 
(1998) warned managers that ethical leadership should be a priority.  The study by Kapp 
and Parboteeah (2008) concluded that ethical climate had a strong influence over safety 
behavior.  Freiwald (2013) concluded that ethical leadership led to fewer occupational 
accidents.  The present study did not match these other studies and did not support the 
construct that ethical leadership plays a significant role in safety behavior and outcomes.  
There is ample evidence in the literature suggesting that future studies continue to test the 
relationship between ELN and safety behaviors.  The positioning of ELN as the 
exogenous variable in future studies is likely to influence the level of significance 
between ELN and safety behaviors.     
 (𝐻6) A positive Ethical leadership (ELN) has a positive influence on pilot 
commitment to the organization (PC).  This hypothesis (𝐻6) could not be tested because 
of the low, cross, and sporadic loading of the PC items during the EFA.             
 
Conclusions 
 This study analyzed the relationship between safety culture (SCN), ethical 
leadership (ELN), and safety performance (NFP).  Schein (2004) stated that corporate 
culture was the personality of the organization and that corporate culture was strongly 
connected with leadership and employee behavior (Schein, 2004).  James Reason (1997) 
wrote that when employees of an organization hold similar beliefs, those beliefs will 
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govern behavior.  In 1979, Butler warned that leaders who distanced themselves from 
tasks may contribute to accidents.  
 The present study tested the nature of this relationship between safety culture and 
ethical leadership.  It was concluded that SCN and ELN had a strong and significant 
relationship.  In addition to this strong and significant relationship, these two factors were 
also highly correlated.  The constructs of SCN and ELN also had discriminant validity 
concerns based on one conservative test of discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2010).  The 
cross-loading of many of the items between the SC and EL factors also suggested a 
strong relationship between the constructs.   
 In the perceptions of the Fractional pilots, the constructs of SC and EL are closely 
related.  Stolzer et al. (2015) confirmed this by suggesting the need for safety mandates to 
have the complete support of the company leadership.  Though these findings re-confirm 
the conclusions by other studies and subject matter experts, there exists a new concern 
about the ability to discriminate between the two constructs in future research.  If SC and 
EL are so closely perceived by Fractional pilots, the construct of SC may be too wide and 
the CASS too broad in scope.  The CASS did not retain the expected factor structure and 
lost 69% of the original items during the study of Fractional pilots.  In contrast to the 
CASS, the ELS (Brown et al., 2005) was concise, and 80% the items remained together 
throughout the EFA and multiple CFA processes.   
 The unexpected result from this study was the non-significant relationship 
between SCN and NFP.  Research from Alsowayigh (2014), Fogarty (2004), and Zohar 
(2000) supported that safety culture or safety climate has a significant effect on safety 
performance.  The number of items in the second order factor SP in the proposed model 
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was reduced from 13 items to 4 (NFP) in the final model.  It is plausible that this 
narrowing of the items may have affected this relationship.  Future research is 
recommended, as it is likely to re-confirm the research from Alsowayigh (2014), Fogarty 
(2004), and Zohar (2000) that safety culture or safety climate influences safety 
performance or safety behavior.   
 The positioning of the ELN factor as the exogenous variable in the recommended 
future model shown in Figure 11 is likely to influence the significance of these 
relationships.  The shifting of the ELN scale to the exogenous position is also consistent 
with the SEM model presented in the Freiwald (2013) research.   
 
Contributions to the Literature 
 This study contributed to the literature by re-confirming several previous studies 
and opening the discussion to re-examine the validity and reliability of four survey 
instruments in the literature.    
 This research supports the O’Connor et al. study (2011) which concluded that, in 
aviation, there are too many different instruments attempting to measure similar 
constructs, and called for future studies to begin confirming the reliability and 
discriminant validity of the existing instruments rather than testing new instruments.  The 
O’Connor et al. (2011) study stated that studies are needed that re-confirm both the 
predictive ability of the instruments and their discriminant validity from other constructs.   
 In the current study with Fractional pilot data, the factor structure of most of the 
instruments used did not maintain their proposed factor structure during the EFA.  This 
lack of factor structure integrity causes a concern that these instruments will not maintain 
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their integrity when tested on various aviation groups in future research.  As suggested by 
O’Connor et al. (2011), confirming predictive capability from unreliable instruments will 
not be possible.  Additionally, if the constructs cannot maintain their discriminant validity 
from other constructs when measured together, the results will be difficult to interpret, 
easily challenged, and have little practical benefit. 
 The CASS (Gibbons et al., 2006) was a very broad instrument and the proposed 
factor structure did not hold up to the Fractional pilot survey data.  The CASS had four 
first order factors with one second order factor for SC.  The post EFA structure was 
reduced to one first order factor (SCN).  It may be argued the CASS was originally 
designed for commercial airline pilots; therefore, the questions were developed for a 
different pilot group.  During this research, there were only minor adaptations needed for 
the CASS to be applicable to Fractional pilots.  The survey was tested with multiple 
experienced pilots before deployment.  Fractional companies and airlines in the U.S. both 
operate very large fleets and face many of the same challenges.  Both pilot groups are 
mostly unionized; therefore, the CASS should be adaptable to the Fractional pilot group. 
 The CASS, in the form used for this study, was arguably overly complex and too 
large in scope for this research.  The items in the CASS overlapped with other 
instruments in the study; however, the main concern was the factor structure was not 
maintained with the data from the Fractional pilots.  The result of the first EFA showed 
16 components with eigenvalues over 1.0 that explained 68% of the variance in the 
model.  The subsequent EFA was constrained to seven factors that explained 67.959% of 
the variation in that model.  The final three components from the EFA model constrained 
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to seven components, made up just 7% of the remaining variance; therefore, those items 
would have added minimal value to the study had they been retained.   
 Of the original 55 items in the CASS, only 17 items were retained in the final 
model due to low, cross, and sporadic loading.  This major reduction in the CASS items 
due to cross-loading combined with the high correlation with the ELN construct suggests 
the CASS is a comprehensive survey instrument and is likely broader in scope than the 
construct of safety culture.  In Appendix E, the 17 remaining CASS items are presented 
for consideration for the measurement of SCN for future research on pilot groups similar 
to Fractional pilots.  The aviation industry needs to agree on a standard set of instruments 
that measures the intended construct and maintains both reliability and discriminant 
validity.  This set of instruments must also possess the ability to predict declines in safety 
behavior or the instruments will be of minimal value. 
 The prediction of safety performance should be forecasted from a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative data.  Survey data may reveal the perception of a decline in 
safety culture which could be the antecedent to a decline in safety performance.  The 
weakness in qualitative data is that self-reported survey data have the potential to be 
biased by the respondent.  Conversely, accurately compiled quantitative data can provide 
unbiased data that can forecast a decline in safety performance.  The weakness in 
quantitative data can be the inability to accurately measure or interpret the data.  The 
weaknesses in both qualitative and quantitative measurements should compel safety 
practitioners to rely on a combination of both qualitative and quantitative data to forecast 
declines in safety performance.           
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Study Limitations 
 The data collected in the study was collected through the voluntary participation 
of Fractional jet pilots in the U.S.  The responses by the participants were based on their 
perception of ELN, SCN, and NFP.  The perceptions of the Fractional pilots may have 
been affected by the challenges between the unions and management during the data 
collection process.  NJASAP completed their negotiation of a new collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA) after years of negotiations in December 2015.  Flight Options pilots 
had been unionized for many years while Flexjet pilots were non-union.  After the merger 
of Flight Options and Flexjet, there was a vote to continue a company-wide union or 
disband the union.  The union passed by a narrow margin.  The total affirmative votes 
were less than the number of existing Flight Options union members; therefore, many 
union members did not vote for the union.  The results were so close they were 
challenged by Flight Options / Flexjet management.   
 Each of the aforementioned issues had the potential to influence the responses 
provided by the Fractional pilots.  Additionally, these situations could have influenced 
which pilots were motivated to participate in the survey.  Nearly all of the Fractional 
pilots in this study were protected by their respective unions; therefore, they would have 
been able to answer the questions in this study without fear of repercussions.              
 One limitation included the inability to confirm the discriminant validity between 
ELN and SCN in one of two tests of discriminant validity conducted.  According to the 
more conservative method from Hair et al. (2010), the AVE for each factor should be 
higher than the squared correlation between factors.  The AVE of SCN was .599; 
however, the squared correlation between SCN and ELN was .677.  In an alternative 
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method for confirming discriminant validity, the correlation coefficient between SCN and 
ELN did pass the standard set by Kline (2005) of <.85 with a correlation of .824.  Based 
on the extensive existing literature demonstrating the factors as distinct and achieving 
Kline’s (2010) <.85, both SCN and ELN were retained.  The relatively high correlation 
and inability to confirm discriminant validity by one methodology may have been due to 
the broad scope of questions in the CASS and the question content being similar between 
these factors.  Several of the original CASS items loaded better on the ELPC variable 
than the SCN during the CFA.   
 In the final revisions of the CFA and the SEM, there was a negative variance 
discovered in the model.  This issue was determined to be a Heywood case and may have 
been caused by the M2 not meeting the suggested minimum of three items loading on 
ATN and three items loading on ERN (Hair et al., 2006).  The solution suggested by Hair 
et al. (2006) was to equalize the regression weights in the model for the ATN and ERN 
items.  The ATN items were both set to 1.0 and the ERN items were both set to .005, and 
the issue was resolved.  The model fit worsened from revision 8 to revision 9 by a 
minimal amount as shown in Table 12.                    
 
Practical Implications 
 The practical implication of this research may be far reaching for general aviation 
and for AMCs.  New and inexpensive survey programs can be implemented and 
monitored that could improve the understanding of the relationship between the AMC 
and their pilots.  Additionally, these monitoring programs may prove to have the ability 
to predict a decline in safety behavior.  
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 The conclusion that SCN predicts ELN should encourage AMCs to monitor these 
factors within their organizations.  The implementation of a survey-based measurement 
program is inexpensive and easy to both implement and interpret.  A survey-based 
measurement program may also be considered part of the requirement for their AMC’s 
SMS to continually improve safety (Stolzer & Goglia., 2015).  The AMC would be able 
to identify and react to any declines in the SCN and or ELN.  This identification and 
reaction has the potential to improve the organization’s culture and relationship with their 
pilots.  A positive safety culture and a positive perception of leadership have been 
demonstrated in other studies to reduce accidents and improve safety behavior.  
 The other important implication of this research is that AMC owners and 
organizational leaders may realize their leadership is an important aspect for both the 
financial success and the safety of their organization.  Brown et al. (2005) stated that if 
leaders are attractive, credible, and legitimate, they will govern employee’s behavior.  
Schein (2004) stated that a strong positive culture leads to better financial performance.  
This research study concluded that SCN and ELN are highly correlated and, therefore, 
both are of critical importance to the success of the organization.  The leaders of AMCs 
must be ethical and strong leaders who create a just and blame free organization that 
encourages open communication.  AMC leaders must be committed to safety initiatives 
to realize any long-lasting effects of their efforts (Helmreich et al., 1997).  Strong and 
ethical AMC leaders may enjoy a financially sound and safe operation. 
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Future Research 
 O’Connor et al. (2011) called for the repeated use of common survey instruments 
that could withstand rigorous discriminant validity and predict reliable results.  This 
study re-confirmed the need for survey instruments that can be applied across different 
groups and maintain both construct integrity and discriminant validity.  In aviation, there 
needs to be a reliable instrument or small set of instruments that are open for use across 
diverse groups.  This common group of survey instruments needs to have the ability to 
detect a decline in safety behavior or their antecedents early enough to implement 
solutions before these declines become safety issues.   
 The IS, PC, and AT items used from the literature did not load strongly on their 
hypothesized factors and, therefore, may not be reliable instruments for future research 
with Fractional pilots or similar groups, or the questions would need to be revised.  
Future instruments need to be concise and measure the intended construct efficiently.  
The IS, PC, and AT factors may not provide enough benefit for future studies on similar 
pilot groups.    
 Future research may include the following alternative SEM model based on the 
existing literature from Brown et al. (2005) and Freiwald (2013).  The Brown, Treviño, & 
Harrison (2005) and Freiwald (2013) studies suggested ethical leadership has an 
influence on safety behavior and outcomes.  These studies suggest that future research 
may be conducted with ethical leadership or the wider construct of leadership as the 
exogenous or predictor variable in a causal model with safety culture and safety 
performance as the endogenous variables.  The following model for future SEM research 
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has the potential for strong and significant relationships of both hypotheses (see Figure 
11).  
 
 
  
   
Figure 11.  Proposed Future SEM Model. 
  
 
 
 Conducting the revised study on similar pilot groups with varying historical safety 
records may yield actionable group differences.  The Fractional companies have achieved 
a superior safety record when compared with Charter operators; therefore, conducting the 
same study for random Charter pilots in the U.S. has the potential to both test the revised 
model and identify group differences.  If significant, these group differences may lead to 
strategies to improve general aviation safety.  
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 Future studies should include a reliable and quantifiable data source to augment 
the self-reporting data.  Zohar’s study (2000) used quantifiable data as the endogenous 
variable from which to draw conclusions.  Zohar has advocated the use of quantifiable 
data such as micro-accidents as the endogenous variable in a safety climate research.  In 
general aviation, the accident and incident rates are so low that drawing valid conclusions 
about antecedents to accidents and incidents may not be valid (O’Connor, 2011).  In an 
unpublished study using quantifiable data in commercial aviation, Cistone et al. (2011) 
encountered issues with the reliability and validity of the accelerometer measurements for 
hard landings at one Middle Eastern airline.  The accelerometers had both measurement 
errors and instrument calibration issues across the fleet that made drawing conclusions 
from the data difficult.    
 Self-reported data will remain an important part of aviation safety due to 
infrequency of accidents and or incidents; however, augmenting survey data with reliable 
and quantifiable data would be recommended to create a more comprehensive 
methodology to predict declines in aviation safety.  In 2000, Zohar used micro-accidents 
to illuminate declines in safety before more serious accidents could occur.  The Quick 
Access Recorder (QAR) installed in many aircraft, records operational data, such as pilot 
inputs.  This QAR data can be analyzed and used as an indication that safety is declining.  
For example, in May 2014, a G-IV crashed while departing Bedford, MA (KBED).  In its 
report, the NTSB reviewed the QAR data and determined the crew had not performed a 
proper check of the flight controls on 89.8% of the previous 176 flights (NTSB AAR-
15/03, 2015).  If the QAR data had been monitored, it would have demonstrated this 
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crew’s disregard for standard pre-flight checks, and corrective actions could have been 
implemented that would have likely prevented this accident. 
 Finally, the instruments used in aviation need to be more reliable, freely available 
for use in other studies, and must maintain discriminant validity when used with other 
instruments.  These instruments need to be concise and measure the intended construct.  
Without the open and repeated use of a distinct and reliable instrument or a small set of 
instruments, aviation is unlikely to realize the potential benefits of forecasting a decline 
in safety behavior.  Reliable forecasting of declines in safety behavior has the potential to 
prevent catastrophic aviation accidents.           
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Safety Culture & Performance Survey 
Consent for Participation in Survey Research 
 
 
I am 18 years or older and volunteer to participate in a research study conducted by Kevin O’Leary 
(Ph.D. Candidate) from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. I understand that the study is 
designed to gather information about Safety Culture in Fractional Jet Pilots. I will be one of 
approximately 300-700 pilots completing this survey. 
 
1. My participation in this project is voluntary. I understand that I will not be paid for my 
participation though a donation to the Corporate Angel Network will be made for each completed 
survey. 
 
I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any time without penalty. If I decline to participate 
or withdraw from the study, no one will be told. 
 
2. I understand that most respondents will find the survey questions interesting and thought- 
provoking. If, however, I feel uncomfortable in any way during the survey, I have the right to end the 
survey. 
 
3. Participation involves completing an anonymous 93 question online survey. The survey takes an 
average of 13 minutes and can be completed on a most devices with an internet connection   
including smart phones (landscape view), tablets or computers. 
 
4. I understand that the researcher will not know my identity and I will not be asked to provide any 
identifiable data about myself. My confidentiality as a respondent in this survey will remain secure. 
Subsequent uses of records and data will be subject to standard data use policies which protect    
the anonymity of individuals and institutions. 
 
5. No organization, institution or company (except the principal researcher) will have access to the 
raw responses. This precaution will prevent my individual responses from having any negative 
repercussions. 
 
6. I understand that this research study has been reviewed and approved by the Institutional   
Review Board (IRB) for the use of Human Subjects in Research at the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University. For research problems or questions regarding subjects, the Institutional Review Board 
may be contacted through: 
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David C. Ison, Ph.D. Research Chair 
Assistant Professor of Aeronautics College of Aeronautics 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Worldwide 
Editor, International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace Office 
(Cell): (503) 507-5697 
email: isond46@erau.edu Skype: david.ison73 
Website:  http://worldwide.erau.edu 
 
7. If requested, I will be given a copy of this consent   form. 
 
8. I have read and understand the explanation provided to me. I have had all 
my questions answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to 
participate in this study. My continuation with this survey will serve as 
confirmation of my consent to participate in this study. 
Thank you very much for your participation in this important study. Principal 
Investigator 
Kevin O’Leary Ph.D. Candidate 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University olearyk1@my.erau.edu 
617-600-6868 
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Safety Culture & Performance Survey 
Survey Introduction 
 
 
 
* 1. Are you currently a jet pilot at a one of the following U.S. based fractional Aircraft Management 
Companies (AMCs)? 
(NetJets, Flight Options, Flexjet or Executive AirShare) 
 
  Yes 
No 
 
Definition: 
 
Aircraft Management Company (AMC) refers to the organization that operates and manages aircraft while maintaining an operating 
certificate such as FAR 135 / Charter or FAR 91K / Fractional. 
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Safety Culture & Performance Survey 
Demographic Information 
 
 
Demographic Information 
 
* 2. What best describes your position within the Aircraft Management Company (AMC)? (Select one, 
please) 
  Pilot with Office / Management responsibilities 
  Pilot with other responsibilities (Instructor, Check Airman, etc.) 
  Pilot (Captain / PIC) 
  Pilot (First Officer / SIC) 
 
*   3. What category of aircraft based on Maximum Takeoff Weight (MTOW) do you primarily fly? 
 
  Light Jet (up to 19,999 lbs) 
  Mid-sized Jet (20,000 - 29,999 lbs) 
  Super Mid-sized Jet (30,000 - 39,999 lbs) 
  Large Jet (40,000 - 49,999 lbs) 
  Long Range (50,000 lbs or greater) 
 
* 4. How many total hours of pilot experience do you have? 
 
  0 - 2,499 hours 
  2,500 - 4,999 hours 
  5,000 - 7,499 hours 
  7,500 - 9,999 hours 
  10,000 hours or more 
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* 5. How long have you worked for this Aircraft Management Company (AMC)? 
 
  0-4 years 
  5-9 years 
  10-14 years 
  15 or more years 
 
* 6. What year were you born? 
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Safety Culture & Performance Survey 
 
 
 
* 7. Safety is a core value in my Aircraft Management Company (AMC). 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 8. Management is more concerned with making money than being safe. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 9. Management expects pilots to push for on-time performance, even if it means compromising safety. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 10. Management doesn't show much concern for safety until there is an accident or an incident. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
* 11. Management does not cut corners where safety is concerned. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
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Safety Culture & Performance Survey 
 
* 12. Checklists and procedures are easy to understand. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 13. My Aircraft Management Company's (AMC's) manuals are carefully kept up to date. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 14. My Aircraft Management Company (AMC) is willing to invest money and effort to improve safety. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 15. My Aircraft Management Company (AMC) is committed to equipping aircraft with up-to-date technology. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 16. My Aircraft Management Company (AMC) ensures that maintenance on aircraft is adequately 
performed and that aircraft are safe to operate. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
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Safety Culture & Performance Survey 
 
* 17. Management goes above and beyond regulatory minimums when it comes to issues of flight safety. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 18. Management schedules pilots as much as legally possible; with little concern for pilots' sleep schedule or 
fatigue. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 19. Management tries to get around safety requirements whenever they get a chance. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 20. Management views regulation violations very seriously, even when they don't result in any serious 
damage. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
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Safety Culture & Performance Survey 
 
 
 
* 21. Chief pilots do not hesitate to contact line pilots to proactively discuss safety issues. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
* 22. Chief pilots are unavailable when line pilots need help. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 23. As long as there is no accident or incident, chief pilots don't care how flight operations are performed. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 24. Chief pilots have a clear understanding of risks associated with flight operations. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 25. Pilots often report safety concerns to their chief pilot rather than the safety officer (safety department). 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
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Safety Culture & Performance Survey 
 
 
* 26. Dispatch consistently emphasizes information or details (e.g., weather requirements, NOTAMs) that 
affect flight safety. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 27. Dispatch inappropriately uses the MEL (e.g., use when it would be better to fix equipment). 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 28. Dispatch is responsive to pilots' concerns about safety. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 29. Dispatch would rather take a chance with safety than cancel a flight. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
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* 30. Instructors/trainers have a clear understanding of risks associated with flight operations. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 31. Safety is consistently emphasized during training at my Aircraft Management Company (AMC). 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 32. Instructors/trainers teach shortcuts and ways to get around safety requirements. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 33. Instructors/trainers prepare pilots for various safety situations, even uncommon or unlikely ones. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
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Safety Culture & Performance Survey 
 
* 34. The safety reporting system is convenient and easy to use. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 35. Pilots can report safety discrepancies without fear of negative repercussions. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 36. Pilots are willing to report information regarding marginal performance or unsafe actions of other pilots. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 37. Pilots don't bother reporting near misses or close calls since these events don't cause any real 
damage. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 38. Pilots are willing to file reports about unsafe situations, even if the situation was caused by their own 
actions. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
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*  
* 39. Safety issues raised by pilots are communicated regularly to all other pilots in this Aircraft Management 
Company (AMC). 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
* 40. When a pilot reports a safety problem, it is corrected in a timely manner. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
* 41. Pilots are satisfied with the way this Aircraft Management Company (AMC) deals with safety reports. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 42. My Aircraft Management Company (AMC) only keeps track of major safety problems and overlooks 
routine ones. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
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Safety Culture & Performance Survey 
 
 
 
* 43. Personnel responsible for safety hold a high status in the Aircraft Management Company (AMC). 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
* 44. Personnel responsible for safety have the power to make changes. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 45. Personnel responsible for safety have a clear understanding of the risks involved in flying the line. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
* 46. Safety personnel have little or no authority compared to operations personnel. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
* 47. Safety personnel demonstrate a consistent commitment to safety. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
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Safety Culture & Performance Survey 
 
 
* 48. Management shows favoritism to certain pilots. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 49. Standards of accountability are consistently applied to all pilots in this organization. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 50. When pilots make a mistake or do something wrong, they are dealt with fairly by the Aircraft 
Management Company (AMC). 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 51. When an accident or incident happens, management immediately blames the pilot. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
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Safety Culture & Performance Survey 
 
 
* 52. Pilots are seldom asked for input when Aircraft Management Company (AMC) procedures are 
developed or changed. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 53. Pilots are actively involved in identifying and resolving safety concerns. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 54. Pilots who call in sick or fatigued are scrutinized by the chief pilot or other management personnel. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
* 55. Pilots have little real authority to make decisions that affect the safety of normal flight operations. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 56. Management rarely questions a pilot's decision to delay a flight for a safety issue. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
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Safety Culture & Performance Survey 
 
 
* 57. Pilots view the Aircraft Management Company's (AMC's) safety record as their own and take pride in it. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
* 58. Pilots who don't fly safely quickly develop a negative reputation among other pilots. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
* 59. Pilots with less seniority are willing to speak up regarding flight safety issues. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
* 60. Decisions made by senior pilots are difficult to challenge. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
* 61. Pilots don't cut corners or compromise safety regardless of the operational pressures to do so. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
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* 62. I make errors in my job from time to time. 
Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 63. Workload pressures have at times affected the quality of my work. 
Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
* 64. I have made errors that have been detected by other pilots. 
Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree Agree Strongly agree 
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* 65. I will say something if my peers (other pilots) take shortcuts. 
Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
* 66. I will say something if my supervisor takes shortcuts. 
Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
* 67. "Gut instincts" can be used in lieu of the publications and manuals. 
Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 68. There are better ways of performing a task than those described in the publications and manuals. 
Neither disagree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 69. There are better ways of performing a task than those described in the company operations manuals. 
Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
* 70. Bending a procedure is not the same as breaking it. 
Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
\
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* 71. Shortcuts, in order to get a task done, are still violations of procedures. 
 
 
Strongly disagree Disagree 
 
Neither agree nor 
disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 72. Reporting mistakes helps other people learn from them. 
 
 
Strongly disagree Disagree 
 
Neither agree nor 
disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 73. Personnel should be encouraged to report their mistakes. 
 
 
Strongly disagree Disagree 
 
Neither agree nor 
disagree Agree Strongly agree 
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* 74. I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to help this Aircraft 
Management Company (AMC) be successful.  
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 75. I talk up this Aircraft Management Company (AMC) to my friends as a great organization to work for. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 76. I would accept almost any type of pilot assignment in order to keep working for this Aircraft 
Management Company (AMC). 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 77. I find that my values and the Aircraft Management Company's (AMC's) values are very similar. 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 78. I am proud to tell others that I am part of this Aircraft Management Company (AMC). 
Somewhat Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
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* 79. This Aircraft Management Company (AMC) really inspires the best in me in the way of job performance. 
 
 Somewhat Neither agree nor  
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 80. I am extremely glad I chose this Aircraft Management Company (AMC) to work for over others I was considering at the 
time I joined. 
 Somewhat Neither agree nor  
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 81. I really care about the fate of this Aircraft Management Company (AMC). 
 
 Somewhat Neither agree nor  
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 82. For me, this is the best of all Aircraft Management Companies (AMCs) for which to work. 
 
 Somewhat Neither agree nor  
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree 
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* 83. Company managers conduct their personal lives in an ethical manner. 
Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 84. Company management defines success not just by results but also the way that they are obtained. 
Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 85. Company management listens to what employees have to say. 
Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 86. Company management disciplines employees who violate ethical standards. 
Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 87. Company management makes fair and balanced decisions. 
Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
* 88. Company management can be trusted. 
Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
131 
 
 
 
* 89. Company management discusses business ethics or values with employees. 
 
 
Strongly disagree Disagree 
 
Neither agree nor 
disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 90. Company management sets an example of how to do things the right way in terms of ethics. 
 
 
Strongly disagree Disagree 
 
Neither agree nor 
disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 91. Company management has the best interests of employees in mind. 
 
 
Strongly disagree Disagree 
 
Neither agree nor 
disagree Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
* 92. When making decisions, company management asks "what is the right thing to do?" 
 
 
Strongly disagree Disagree 
 
Neither agree nor 
disagree Agree Strongly agree 
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* 93. I am more likely to make judgement errors in abnormal or emergency situations. 
Neither agree nor 
Strongly disagree Disagree disagree Agree Strongly agree 
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Safety Culture & Performance Survey 
Thank you! 
 
 
The principal researcher, Kevin O'Leary thanks you for taking the time to complete this survey. 
A donation to the Corporate Angel Network will be made for each completed survey. 
 
Thank you very much! 
 
Kevin 
O'Leary 
617-600-
6868 
olearyk1@my.erau.edu 
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Tables 
 
C1 Descriptive Statistics 
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Table C1 
Descriptive Statistics 
            Skewness Kurtosis 
Item N Min  Max 
Std. 
Dev Var. Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
OC7. Safety is a 
core value in my 
Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC). 
305 1 7 1.58 2.50 -1.59 0.14 2.04 0.28 
OC8. 
Management is 
more concerned 
with making 
money than being 
safe. 
305 1 7 1.94 3.75 0.36 0.14 -1.21 0.28 
 
OC9. 
Management 
expects pilots to 
push for on-time 
performance, even 
if it means 
compromising 
safety. 
305 1 7 1.84 3.37 0.80 0.14 -0.61 0.28 
 
OC10. 
Management 
doesn't show 
much concern for 
safety until there 
is an accident or 
an incident. 
305 1 7 1.79 3.21 0.87 0.14 -0.45 0.28 
 
OC11. 
Management does 
not cut corners 
where safety is 
concerned. 
305 1 7 1.88 3.52 -0.14 0.14 -1.33 0.28 
 
OC12. Checklists 
and procedures are 
easy to 
understand. 
305 1 7 1.31 1.72 -1.34 0.14 1.32 0.28 
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OC13. My 
Aircraft 
Management 
Company's 
(AMC's) manuals 
are carefully kept 
up to date. 
305 2 7 1.02 1.04 -1.68 0.14 3.75 0.28 
 
OC14. My 
Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC) 
is willing to invest 
money and effort 
to improve safety. 
305 1 7 1.31 1.71 -1.08 0.14 1.42 0.28 
 
OC15. My 
Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC) 
is committed to 
equipping aircraft 
with up-to-date 
technology. 
305 1 7 1.51 2.27 -0.89 0.14 0.32 0.28 
 
OC16. My 
Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC) 
ensures that 
maintenance on 
aircraft is 
adequately 
performed and 
that aircraft are 
safe to operate. 
305 1 7 1.59 2.52 -0.88 0.14 -0.10 0.28 
 
OC17. 
Management goes 
above and beyond 
regulatory 
minimums when it 
comes to issues of 
flight safety. 
305 1 7 1.53 2.35 -0.65 0.14 -0.38 0.28 
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OC18. 
Management 
schedules pilots as 
much as legally 
possible; with 
little concern for 
pilots' sleep 
schedule or 
fatigue. 
305 1 7 1.80 3.23 -0.66 0.14 -0.74 0.28 
 
OC19. 
Management tries 
to get around 
safety 
requirements 
whenever they get 
a chance. 
305 1 7 1.76 3.11 0.64 0.14 -0.65 0.28 
 
OC20. 
Management 
views regulation 
violations very 
seriously, even 
when they don't 
result in any 
serious damage. 
305 1 7 1.33 1.76 -0.94 0.14 0.56 0.28 
 
OP21. Chief pilots 
do not hesitate to 
contact line pilots 
to proactively 
discuss safety 
issues. 
305 1 7 1.72 2.97 -0.50 0.14 -0.75 0.28 
 
OP22. Chief pilots 
are unavailable 
when line pilots 
need help. 
305 1 7 1.54 2.36 1.03 0.14 0.28 0.28 
 
OP23. As long as 
there is no 
accident or 
incident, chief 
pilots don't care 
how flight 
305 1 7 1.74 3.02 1.00 0.14 -0.14 0.28 
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operations are 
performed. 
OP24. Chief pilots 
have a clear 
understanding of 
risks associated 
with flight 
operations. 
305 1 7 1.43 2.06 -1.15 0.14 0.85 0.28 
 
OP25. Pilots often 
report safety 
concerns to their 
chief pilot rather 
than the safety 
officer (safety 
department). 
305 1 7 1.65 2.71 -0.12 0.14 -0.95 0.28 
 
OP26. Dispatch 
consistently 
emphasizes 
information or 
details (e.g., 
weather 
requirements, 
NOTAMs) that 
affect flight 
safety. 
305 1 7 1.83 3.34 -0.27 0.14 -1.11 0.28 
 
OP27. Dispatch 
inappropriately 
uses the MEL 
(e.g., use when it 
would be better to 
fix equipment). 
305 1 7 1.84 3.38 0.07 0.14 -1.23 0.28 
 
OP28. Dispatch is 
responsive to 
pilots' concerns 
about safety. 
305 1 7 1.47 2.16 -1.01 0.14 0.43 0.28 
 
OP29. Dispatch 
would rather take 
a chance with 
safety than cancel 
a flight. 
305 1 7 1.73 2.99 0.69 0.14 -0.64 0.28 
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OP30. 
Instructors/trainers 
have a clear 
understanding of 
risks associated 
with flight 
operations. 
305 2 7 1.15 1.33 -1.24 0.14 1.51 0.28 
 
OP31. Safety is 
consistently 
emphasized 
during training at 
my Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC). 
305 2 7 1.14 1.30 -1.31 0.14 1.78 0.28 
 
OP32. 
Instructors/trainers 
teach shortcuts 
and ways to get 
around safety 
requirements. 
305 1 7 1.01 1.02 1.95 0.14 5.60 0.28 
 
OP33. 
Instructors/trainers 
prepare pilots for 
various safety 
situations, even 
uncommon or 
unlikely ones. 
305 1 7 1.29 1.67 -1.20 0.14 1.30 0.28 
 
FS34. The safety 
reporting system 
is convenient and 
easy to use. 
305 1 7 1.37 1.88 -1.25 0.14 1.20 0.28 
FS35. Pilots can 
report safety 
discrepancies 
without fear of 
negative 
repercussions. 
305 1 7 1.38 1.90 -1.66 0.14 2.68 0.28 
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FS36. Pilots are 
willing to report 
information 
regarding 
marginal 
performance or 
unsafe actions of 
other pilots. 
305 1 7 1.58 2.51 -0.20 0.14 -0.96 0.28 
 
FS37. Pilots don't 
bother reporting 
near misses or 
close calls since 
these events don't 
cause any real 
damage. 
305 1 7 1.49 2.21 0.57 0.14 -0.61 0.28 
 
FS38. Pilots are 
willing to file 
reports about 
unsafe situations, 
even if the 
situation was 
caused by their 
own actions. 
305 1 7 1.16 1.35 -1.09 0.14 1.29 0.28 
 
FS39. Safety 
issues raised by 
pilots are 
communicated 
regularly to all 
other pilots in this 
Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC). 
305 1 7 1.80 3.25 -0.64 0.14 -0.76 0.28 
 
FS40. When a 
pilot reports a 
safety problem, it 
is corrected in a 
timely manner. 
305 1 7 1.53 2.36 -0.36 0.14 -0.60 0.28 
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FS41. Pilots are 
satisfied with the 
way this Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC) 
deals with safety 
reports. 
305 1 7 1.67 2.78 -0.36 0.14 -0.86 0.28 
 
FS42. My Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC) 
only keeps track 
of major safety 
problems and 
overlooks routine 
ones. 
305 1 7 1.52 2.32 0.65 0.14 -0.38 0.28 
 
FS43. Personnel 
responsible for 
safety hold a high 
status in the 
Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC). 
305 1 7 1.49 2.21 -0.59 0.14 -0.19 0.28 
 
FS44. Personnel 
responsible for 
safety have the 
power to make 
changes. 
305 1 7 1.57 2.47 -0.42 0.14 -0.70 0.28 
 
FS45. Personnel 
responsible for 
safety have a clear 
understanding of 
the risks involved 
in flying the line. 
305 1 7 1.62 2.63 -0.83 0.14 -0.11 0.28 
FS46. Safety 
personnel have 
little or no 
authority 
compared to 
operations 
personnel. 
305 1 7 1.67 2.79 0.10 0.14 -0.94 0.28 
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FS47. Safety 
personnel 
demonstrate a 
consistent 
commitment to 
safety. 
305 1 7 1.41 1.99 -0.92 0.14 0.47 0.28 
 
IS48. 
Management 
shows favoritism 
to certain pilots. 
305 1 7 1.69 2.84 -1.00 0.14 0.10 0.28 
 
IS49. Standards of 
accountability are 
consistently 
applied to all 
pilots in this 
organization. 
305 1 7 1.96 3.84 -0.10 0.14 -1.35 0.28 
 
IS50. When pilots 
make a mistake or 
do something 
wrong, they are 
dealt with fairly 
by the Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC). 
305 1 7 1.71 2.91 -0.48 0.14 -0.77 0.28 
 
IS51. When an 
accident or 
incident happens, 
management 
immediately 
blames the pilot. 
305 1 7 1.70 2.89 0.12 0.14 -0.84 0.28 
 
IS52. Pilots are 
seldom asked for 
input when 
Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC) 
procedures are 
developed or 
changed. 
305 1 7 1.82 3.31 -0.31 0.14 -1.15 0.28 
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IS53. Pilots are 
actively involved 
in identifying and 
resolving safety 
concerns. 
305 1 7 1.70 2.90 -0.39 0.14 -0.97 0.28 
IS54. Pilots who 
call in sick or 
fatigued are 
scrutinized by the 
chief pilot or other 
management 
personnel. 
305 1 7 2.02 4.07 0.32 0.14 -1.26 0.28 
 
IS55. Pilots have 
little real authority 
to make decisions 
that affect the 
safety of normal 
flight operations. 
305 1 7 1.73 3.01 1.31 0.14 0.55 0.28 
 
IS56. 
Management 
rarely questions a 
pilot's decision to 
delay a flight for a 
safety issue. 
305 1 7 1.93 3.73 -0.51 0.14 -1.09 0.28 
 
IS57. Pilots view 
the Aircraft 
Management 
Company's 
(AMC's) safety 
record as their 
own and take 
pride in it. 
305 1 7 1.40 1.95 -1.01 0.14 0.45 0.28 
 
IS58. Pilots who 
don't fly safely 
quickly develop a 
negative 
reputation among 
other pilots 
305 2 7 1.15 1.33 -1.04 0.14 1.20 0.28 
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IS59. Pilots with 
less seniority are 
willing to speak 
up regarding flight 
safety issues. 
305 1 7 1.42 2.02 -0.98 0.14 0.29 0.28 
 
IS60. Decisions 
made by senior 
pilots are difficult 
to challenge. 
305 1 7 1.46 2.13 0.91 0.14 -0.05 0.28 
 
IS61. Pilots don't 
cut corners or 
compromise 
safety regardless 
of the operational 
pressures to do so. 
305 1 7 1.59 2.53 -0.52 0.14 -0.80 0.28 
 
ER62. I make 
errors in my job 
from time to time. 
305 1 5 0.55 0.30 -0.53 0.14 3.84 0.28 
 
ER63. Workload 
pressures have at 
times affected the 
quality of my 
work. 
305 1 5 0.87 0.76 -1.34 0.14 2.26 0.28 
 
ER64. I have 
made errors that 
have been 
detected by other 
pilots. 
305 1 5 0.56 0.31 -0.77 0.14 4.55 0.28 
 
AT65. I will say 
something if my 
peers (other pilots) 
take short cuts. 
305 2 5 0.57 0.33 -0.47 0.14 1.86 0.28 
AT66. I will say 
something if my 
supervisor takes 
shortcuts. 
305 1 5 0.71 0.51 -0.81 0.14 1.57 0.28 
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AT67. Gut 
instincts can be 
used in lieu of the 
publications and 
manuals. 
305 1 5 0.97 0.94 0.40 0.14 -0.52 0.28 
AT68. There are 
better ways of 
performing a task 
than those 
described in the 
publications and 
manuals. 
305 1 5 0.94 0.88 -0.19 0.14 -0.29 0.28 
AT69. There are 
better ways of 
performing a task 
than those 
described in the 
company 
operations 
manuals. 
305 1 5 0.98 0.97 -0.19 0.14 -0.49 0.28 
 
AT70. Bending a 
procedure is not 
the same as 
breaking it. 
305 1 5 0.88 0.78 0.38 0.14 -0.45 0.28 
 
AT71. Shortcuts, 
in order to get a 
task done, are still 
violations * of 
procedures. 
305 1 5 0.81 0.66 -0.87 0.14 1.17 0.28 
 
AT72. Reporting 
mistakes helps 
other people learn 
from them. 
305 2 5 0.59 0.35 -0.62 0.14 0.49 0.28 
 
AT73. Personnel 
should be 
encouraged to 
report their 
mistakes. 
305 2 5 0.57 0.33 -0.64 0.14 0.04 0.28 
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PC74. I am 
willing to put in a 
great deal of effort 
beyond that 
normally expected 
in order to help 
this Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC) 
be successful. 
305 1 7 1.24 1.55 -1.33 0.14 2.05 0.28 
 
PC75. I talk up 
this Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC) 
to my friends as a 
great organization 
to work for. 
305 1 7 1.72 2.96 -0.64 0.14 -0.50 0.28 
 
PC76. I would 
accept almost any 
type of pilot 
assignment in 
order to keep 
working for this 
Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC). 
305 1 7 1.85 3.43 0.08 0.14 -1.20 0.28 
 
PC77. I find that 
my values and the 
Aircraft 
Management 
Company's 
(AMC's) values 
are very similar. 
305 1 7 1.77 3.14 -0.47 0.14 -0.84 0.28 
 
PC78. I am proud 
to tell others that I 
am part of this 
Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC). 
305 1 7 1.67 2.78 -0.91 0.14 -0.06 0.28 
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PC79. This 
Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC) 
really inspires the 
best in me in the 
way of job 
performance. 
305 1 7 1.71 2.91 -0.44 0.14 -0.69 0.28 
 
PC80. I am 
extremely glad I 
chose this Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC) 
to work for over 
others I was 
considering at the 
time I joined. 
305 1 7 1.84 3.40 -0.85 0.14 -0.41 0.28 
 
PC81. I really care 
about the fate of 
this Aircraft 
Management 
Company (AMC). 
305 1 7 1.38 1.91 -1.96 0.14 3.72 0.28 
 
PC82. For me, this 
is the best of all 
Aircraft 
Management 
Companies 
(AMCs) for which 
to work. 
305 1 7 1.78 3.18 -1.16 0.14 0.12 0.28 
 
EL83. Company 
managers conduct 
their personal 
lives in an ethical 
manner. 
305 1 5 0.93 0.86 -0.34 0.14 0.47 0.28 
 
EL84. Company 
management 
defines success 
not just by results 
but also the way 
that they are 
obtained. 
305 1 5 0.99 0.98 -0.29 0.14 -0.41 0.28 
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EL85. Company 
management 
listens to what 
employees have to 
say. 
305 1 5 1.11 1.24 -0.22 0.14 -0.85 0.28 
EL86. Company 
management 
disciplines 
employees who 
violate ethical 
standards. 
305 1 5 0.90 0.81 -0.97 0.14 0.68 0.28 
 
EL87. Company 
management 
makes fair and 
balanced 
decisions. 
305 1 5 1.07 1.15 -0.15 0.14 -0.77 0.28 
 
EL88. Company 
management can 
be trusted. 
305 1 5 1.18 1.40 0.13 0.14 -0.91 0.28 
EL89. Company 
management 
discusses business 
ethics or values 
with employees. 
305 1 5 1.01 1.03 -0.91 0.14 0.41 0.28 
EL90. Company 
management sets 
an example of 
how to do things 
the right way in 
terms of ethics. 
305 1 5 1.23 1.50 0.02 0.14 -1.12 0.28 
EL91. Company 
management has 
the best interests 
of employees in 
mind. 
305 1 5 1.12 1.25 0.23 0.14 -0.76 0.28 
EL92. When 
making decisions, 
company 
management asks 
"what is the right 
thing to do?" 
305 1 5 1.09 1.20 0.05 0.14 -0.77 0.28 
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A93. I am more 
likely to make 
judgement errors 
in abnormal or 
emergency 
situations. 
305 1 5 1.01 1.03 0.24 0.14 -0.94 0.28 
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APPENDIX D 
Tables 
Table D1  
Total Variance Explained for EFA 
  Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
Comp Total 
% of 
Var. 
*Cumul 
% Total 
% of 
Var 
*Cumul 
% Total 
% of 
Var 
*Cumul 
% 
1 18.886 46.064 46.064 18.886 46.064 46.064 9.320 22.733 22.733 
2 2.227 5.431 51.495 2.227 5.431 51.495 8.514 20.766 43.499 
3 1.792 4.370 55.865 1.792 4.370 55.865 2.630 6.414 49.913 
4 1.585 3.865 59.730 1.585 3.865 59.730 2.260 5.511 55.424 
5 1.245 3.036 62.766 1.245 3.036 62.766 2.196 5.355 60.780 
6 1.096 2.674 65.440 1.096 2.674 65.440 1.764 4.301 65.081 
7 1.033 2.519 67.959 1.033 2.519 67.959 1.180 2.878 67.959 
*Cumul % is the Cumulative Percentage       
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Table D2  
 
Rotated Correlation Matrix for EFA 
 
Components 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
OC8. -.680 -.460      
OC9. -.793 -.382      
OC10. -.777 -.383      
OC11.  .481 .441      
OC14.  .529 .382 .387     
OC16.  .643 .379 .376     
OC17.  .618 .423 .331     
OC19.  -.709 -.428      
OC20.  .527 .309 .483     
OP21.  .449 .404      
OP22.  -.639       
OP23.  -.661 -.343      
OP24.  .623  .391     
OP27.  -.627 -.347      
OP28.  .708       
OP29.  -.768       
OP31.  .475  .482     
FS36.     .753    
FS38.     .716    
FS40.  .452 .462 .420 .330    
FS41.  .497 .421 .365 .339    
FS42.  -.531 -.343      
FS47. .440 .383 .447     
IS48. -.403 -.601      
IS49.  .380 .596      
IS53.  .361 .447  .457    
ER62.       .889  
ER64.       .897  
AT66.        .801 
AT68.      .917   
AT69.      .891   
AT70.      .524  -.346 
PC74.    .687    .396 
EL83. .308 .650      
EL84.   .638      
EL85.  .409 .718      
EL87.  .350 .809      
152 
 
 
EL88.  .344 .821      
EL90.  .333 .831      
EL91.  .331 .806      
EL92.    .807           
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 13 iterations. 
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APPENDIX E 
Suggested Future CASS Survey Questions  
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OC8. Management is more concerned with making money than being safe. 
 
OC9. Management expects pilots to push for on-time performance, even if it means 
compromising safety. 
 
OC10. Management doesn't show much concern for safety until there is an accident or an 
incident. 
 
OC14. My Aircraft Management Company (AMC) is willing to invest money and effort 
to improve safety. 
 
OC16. My Aircraft Management Company (AMC) ensures that maintenance on aircraft 
is adequately performed and that aircraft are safe to operate. 
  
OC17. Management goes above and beyond regulatory minimums when it comes to 
issues of flight safety. 
 
OC19. Management tries to get around safety requirements whenever they get a chance. 
 
OC20. Management views regulation violations very seriously, even when they don't 
result in any serious damage. 
 
OP21. Chief pilots do not hesitate to contact line pilots to proactively discuss safety 
issues. 
 
OP23. As long as there is no accident or incident, chief pilots don't care how flight 
operations are performed. 
 
OP24. Chief pilots have a clear understanding of risks associated with flight operations. 
 
OP27. Dispatch inappropriately uses the MEL (e.g., use when it would be better to fix 
equipment). 
 
OP29. Dispatch would rather take a chance with safety than cancel a flight. 
 
FS40. When a pilot reports a safety problem, it is corrected in a timely manner. 
 
FS41. Pilots are satisfied with the way this Aircraft Management Company (AMC) deals 
with safety reports. 
 
FS42. My Aircraft Management Company (AMC) only keeps track of major safety 
problems and overlooks routine ones. 
 
FS47. Safety personnel demonstrate a consistent commitment to safety. 
